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Note
Remembering the Victims of Sexual Abuse: The
Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offenders in In re J.W.
Joanna C. Enstice*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sex offenders and sexual abuse have long posed a threat to innocent
young children.' However, it is difficult to imagine another child as the
sex offender. 2 Parents typically picture the threat coming from a
stranger on the street or at the playground, not the child down the block
or a child's playmate. 3 Recently, an alarming increase in the number of
* J.D. expected May 2005. I would like to thank my family for their encouragement and
support, and my friends for their support and much needed insight.
1. See JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 78 (1998) ("Today the risks
facing children seem to be expanding exponentially. Sexual abuse accounts for 12 percent of
child abuse cases nationwide .... ); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender
Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated
with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 789 (1996) ("Estimates hold

that one of every three girls and one of every seven boys will be sexually abused before they
reach the age of eighteen."); Mic Hunter, Foreword to CHILD SURVIVORS AND PERPETRATORS
OF SEXUAL ABUSE: TREATMENT INNOVATIONS, at vii (Mic Hunter ed., 1995) ("[E]ven the most
conservative estimates suggest that the sexual abuse of children is all too common in the United
States."); see also KAREN L. KINNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK,
at xi-xii (1995) ("The extent and seriousness of the effects of sexual abuse have ... been
recognized and studied, from earlier attitudes that little damage was done to a child who was
fondled or otherwise abused to the current understanding that the effects of this abuse can be
manifested in many ways and can indeed be serious."); Janis F. Bremer, Juveniles, Rehabilitation,
and Sex Offenses: Changing Laws and Changing Treatment, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1343,

1346 (2003) ("A sexual offense in our society is generally seen as the most heinous of crimes,
particularly if the victim is a child.").
2. See Hunter, supra note 1, at vii ("We know now that.., children abuse other children.").
3. See KINNEAR, supra note 1, at 17. Kinnear states that:
We often believe that children's safety is threatened more by strangers than by those
people the children know. At home and in school, parents and teachers emphasize to
children that they should not talk to strangers or accept candy or rides. We picture
dirty old men in trench coats ready to flash or snatch our children. Most people do not
realize that children who are sexually abused are most likely to be abused by someone
they know and trust. Sexual abusers come from all walks of life, all races, and all
socioeconomic levels. Furthermore, adults are not the only abusers. Adolescents and
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children attacked by juvenile offenders has caused widespread concern. 4
The Center for Sex Offender Management has estimated that juvenile
sex offenders commit up to one-fifth of all rapes and approximately
one-half of all child molestations that occur each year in the United

States.

5

In response to violent sexual crimes committed against children,
Congress and the legislatures of all fifty states have enacted laws that

not only require convicted sex offenders to register with state or federal
agencies but provide for public notification when sex offenders have
registered with the state or moved into the community. 6 These laws
commonly are referred to as "Megan's Laws." 7 The purpose of these

teenagers are also capable of abusing children, including their own brothers and
sisters."
Id.; see also ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1
(1993) ("[W]e have just now begun to allow into our minds the possibility that sexual abuse of
children-not always violent, not necessarily classifiable within current mental health typologies,
and not only at the hands of strangers-happens extensively."); JEAN RENVOIZE, INNOCENCE
DESTROYED: A STUDY OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, at xi (1993) ("[E]ven more worrying is the
growing concern about young offenders who may be so confirmed in their behaviour that by the
age of 10 it can already be too late to redeem them."). Scholars have also noted that an abuser
known by a child will be more likely to sexually abuse that child than a stranger. RENVOIZE,
supra, at 96 ("Where the child is familiar with the abuser she/he might cooperate out of fondness
or trust, not realizing she is being exploited, whereas similar approaches from a stranger are more
likely to be resisted."). For a parental perspective on sexual abuse of children, see MSN Group,
Child
Sexual
Abuse,
A
Parent's
Perspective,
at http://www.angelfire.com/ny/
csasecondaryvictims/ (last updated Aug. 30, 2002) (describing parents' experiences with their
own children's sexual abuse and counseling parents on how to deal with such abuse).
4. Pamela S. Richardson, Note, Mandatory Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification: The Only Viable Option To ProtectAll the Nation's Children, 52 CATH.
U. L. REV. 237, 245 (2002); see also Carter Allen Lee, Comment, When Children Prey on
Children: A Look at Hawaii's Version of Megan's Law and Its Application to Juvenile Sex
Offenders, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 477, 523 (1998) ("Concern over the devastating effect of sex
crimes has risen to display an urgent need for a remedy.").
There are generally two
categorizations for juvenile sex offenders: "sexually abusive youths who abuse peers or adults"
and "offenders who target children." Richardson, supra, at 246. Typical juvenile sex offenders
are males between the ages of thirteen and seventeen, and have had "a history of physical and/or
sexual abuse." Id.
5. TOM TALBOT ET AL., CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT, at http://www.csom.org/pubs/csom-bro.pdf (July 2002).
6. See infra Part II.A (discussing the development of sex offender registration and notification
laws). See generally Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (stating the federal sex offender
registration and notification rule); infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (highlighting certain
provisions of the Jacob Wetterling Act).
7. The term "Megan's Law" arose after the murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by her
neighbor in New Jersey spurred a legislative initiative for sex offender registration and
notification laws. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
Megan's Law).
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8
laws is to help law enforcement personnel track sexual offenders.
While these statutes usually apply to both adult and juvenile sex

offenders, 9 debate has grown over juvenile sex offender registration
because juvenile sex offenders comprise a considerable portion of the
sex offender population, and their actions tend to have more significant

and lasting0 ramifications on the victims than those of other sex

offenders.'
The Illinois Supreme Court recently decided In re J.W., a case

11
involving the issue of sex offender registration for juvenile offenders.

The court interpreted the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (the
"SORA") 12 and its application to juvenile sex offenders and held that
juvenile sex offenders must register. 13 Before the advent of registration
statutes, local law enforcement was unable to keep track of convicted

sex offenders in the community, and deviants who previously had
committed nefarious acts against children were able to attack or kill

8. ScoTr MATSON, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION:
POLICY OVERVIEW AND COMPREHENSIVE PRACTICES, at http://www.csom.org/pubs/sexreg.html
(Oct. 1999); see also People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (I1. 1991) (stating that the intent of
the Illinois Registration Act was to help law enforcement monitor sex offenders).
9. See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplicationof Sexoffender Registration and Community-notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 163

(2003) ("This inclusion is a marked departure from the traditional juvenile justice system of
maintaining separate procedures and consequences for juveniles and adults."); Richardson, supra
note 4, at 239-40 (discussing the trend among states to extend registration laws to juvenile
offenders).
10. See Lee, supra note 4, at 478-79 ("Sexual offenses, unlike other serious crimes,
have . . . far-reaching effect[s] on victims, victim[s'] famil[ies], offender[s'] famil[ies] and
society in general." (footnotes omitted)); Michael L. Skoglund, Note, Private Threats, Public
Stigma? Avoiding False Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the Juvenile Justice
System, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1805, 1815-18 (2000).

Not only are youth a significant proportion of the sex offender population, but the
effects of their behavior are long-lasting and arguably perpetuate the cycle of abuse.
Sexual abuse by minors is ... significant because it often imposes psychological
and social effects on its victims. People who are abused during childhood are more
likely to be arrested later in life. Studies have also demonstrated that convicted
criminals with a history of physical or sexual abuse are more likely than other inmates
to victimize children ..... [T]he primary effects of sexual assault and molestation are
followed by secondary effects that perpetuate the cycles of abuse.
Skoglund, supra, at 1815-18 (footnotes omitted).
11. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2003); see also infra Part III (discussing In re J.W.).
12. Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-150/12 (2002 & West Supp.
2003). This statute requires sex offenders to provide their information to local law enforcement.
Id. § 150/3 ("A sex offender.., or sexual predator shall... register in person and provide
accurate information as required by the Department of State Police. Such information shall
include current address, current place of employment, and school attended.").
13. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 758.
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again. 14 The enactment of the SORA marked the Illinois legislature's
desire to prevent such crimes. 15 In J.W., the court overruled the Illinois
Appellate Court case In re Nicholas K.,' 6 which had excused juvenile
sex offenders from lifelong registration requirements.' 7 Additionally,
the J.W. opinion provided guidance to lower courts in applying the
SORA to juvenile offenders. 18 In upholding the legislative intent of the
SORA to inform and protect the public by monitoring all dangerous
sexual offenders, the court implied that the legislature should not
change the SORA explicitly to prevent its application to juvenile
offenders. 19
Accordingly, this Note will discuss the In re J. W. opinion and
contend that the Illinois Supreme Court correctly interpreted the
SORA. 20 Thus, Part II of this Note will begin by reviewing the history
of federal and state sex offender registration laws 21 and will trace the
development of Illinois statutes requiring sex offenders to register,
including the SORA.2 2 Part II of this Note will then discuss the
constitutional restrictions on registration laws: the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process
24
Clause, 23 as well as the treatment of juveniles in the court system.
Part II of this Note also will examine the rules of statutory construction
25
used by Illinois courts when assessing the constitutionality of a statute
and then will examine the development of the standard set by the
Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether juvenile sex offenders are
required to register. 26 Part III of this Note will review the decisions of
the trial court, the appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court in In

14. See infra note 61 (commenting on the murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka).
15. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Illinois legislature's intent in passing a registration
statute).
16. In re Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 2001).
17. Id. at 355; see also infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text (examining the Nicholas K.
decision).
18. See infra note 374 (discussing recent Illinois decisions that looked toJ. W.).
19. See infra Part IV.B (contending that the legislature should not rewrite the SORA due to
the potential harsh results in its application to juvenile offenders).
20. See infra Parts Ill-IV (discussing and analyzing the J. W. decision).
21. See infra Part II.A (tracing the development of federal and state sex offender registration

and notification statutes).
22. See infra Part II.B (examining the history of sex offender registration statutes in Illinois).
23. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause in the
United States Constitution).
24. See infra Part II.D (examining the court system's treatment of juveniles).
25. See infra Part .E (discussing the Illinois rules of statutory construction).
26. See infra Part II.F (reviewing Illinois Supreme Court and appellate court decisions that
have interpreted sex offender registration and notification statutes).
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re J.W.27 Then, Part IV of this Note will analyze these opinions and
argue that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision correctly construed the
statute and thus helps protect society from potential dangers. 2 8 Finally,
Part V of this Note will discuss the impact of the decision on Illinois
29
citizens and future cases.

II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the history of sex offender laws and the resultant

constitutional challenges and considerations. 30 Section A of this Part
explores the development of federal and state laws requiring sex
offenders to register.3 1 Next, section B of this Part traces the
development of the SORA in Illinois. 32 Section C of this Part discusses
the background of the cruel and unusual punishment and due process
provisions in the United States Constitution. 3 3 Next, section D
34
discusses the general treatment of juveniles in the court system.
Section E of this Part then discusses the statutory construction rules
35
used by Illinois courts to assess the constitutionality of a statute.
Finally, section F reviews the set of Illinois Supreme Court and
appellate court cases that have interpreted and construed the statutory
language of the SORA and established standards by which the SORA is
36
applied to juvenile sex offenders.
A. Jacob's and Megan's Laws: The History of the Sex Offender
RegistrationRequirement
Surprisingly, considering the magnitude of the problem of sexual
abuse of children, most states did not enact sex offender registration
27. See infra Part III (discussing the trial, appellate, and Illinois Supreme Court decisions in
J. W.).
28. See infra Part IV (supporting the majority's decision in J.W. to subject J.W. to the lifetime
registration requirement under the SORA).
29. See infra Part V (describing victims' approval of the J. W. decision and explaining how the
decision will help prevent future crime).
30. See infra Part IIA-F (providing information on the genesis of federal and state sex
offender laws and the resulting constitutional considerations).
31. See infra Part II.A (tracing the history of sex offender registration and notification
statutes).
32. See infra Part II.B (examining the history of the Illinois sex offender registration and
notification statutes).
33. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Due Process Clause and prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment in the United States Constitution).
34. See infra Part II.D (examining the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
35. See infra Part I.E (discussing Illinois statutory-construction rules).
36. See infra Part II.F (reviewing Illinois Supreme Court and appellate court cases that have
interpreted sex offender registration and notification statutes).
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laws until very recently. 37 In fact, by 1986, only five states had enacted
registration laws for sex offenders. 38 California was the first state to
enact a sex offender registration statute, in 1947.39 Arizona, Nevada,

and Alabama soon followed with their own registration laws in 1951,
1961, and 1967, respectively. 40 The purpose of these early laws was to

prevent recidivism of sex offenders
by keeping law enforcement
41

informed of potential attackers.
Although registration laws have existed since 1947, most consider the

Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sex Offender
Registration Act ("Wetterling Act"), enacted in 1994, the advent of the
sex offender registration requirement because this Act was the first
federal statute regulating the issue. 4 2 The Wetterling Act set off a wave
43
of federal and state legislation on sex offenders.

The impetus for the Wetterling Act was the tragic story of elevenyear-old Jacob Wetterling of St. Joseph, Minnesota, a victim of
abduction at the hands of a masked stranger. 44 In October 1989, Jacob

37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that only five states had sex offender
registration statutes in 1986); supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the longstanding

threat of sexual abuse to children).
38. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 164 & n.2. These five states were Alabama, California,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio. People v. Monroe, 215 Cal. Rptr. 51, 58 (Ct. App. 1985)
(citing In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983)).
39. Joan Comparet-Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually Violent Predator, 37

SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2000); see also 1947 Cal. Stat. 1124(1) (codified as amended at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290) (setting forth California's registration statute). But see People v.
North, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337, 347 (2003) (holding certain parts of section 290 as void).
40. David M. Boyers, Emotion over Reason: California'sNew Community Notification and
Chemical Castration Laws Feel Good, but Fail "Sensible" Scrutiny, 28 PAC. L.J. 740, 743 &

n.24 (1997). Arizona repealed its registration statute in 1978. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222
(Cal. 1983). The Arizona state legislature then put into effect a new registration statute in 1983.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821.
41. Boyers, supra note 40, at 743 ("The motivation behind the system was the thought that
registration would combat the high recidivism rate of sex offenders by arming police with
information to aid in the apprehension of suspects.").
42. JACOB WETrERLING FOUND., HISTORY OF THE JW ACT, at http://www.jwf.org/wwwsource/jwfjlegislation.html (last visited May 16, 2004) [hereinafter ACT HISTORY]; Richardson,
supra note 4, at 252.
43. Wayne A. Logan, Jacob'sLegacy: Sex Offender Registrationand Community Notification
Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2003)
("As a result of converging social and political forces, including the increasingly influential
victims' rights, child welfare, and women's movements, augmented by media attention of
unprecedented influence, legislatures nationwide fixated on 'sexual predators."' (footnote
omitted)).
44. JACOB WETTERLING FOUND., JACOB'S STORY, at http://www.jwf.org/Jacobs-story.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter JACOB'S STORY] (describing the story of Jacob's
abduction). Jacob has never been found, and his abductor has never been apprehended. Terry
Collins, Search Goes on for Missing Girl: Weariness,Anxiety Growing in Chisholm, STAR TRIB.
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was on his bicycle on his way home from a convenience store with his
brother Trevor and his friend Aaron when a masked man holding a gun
accosted the boys.4 5 The man asked the boys their ages, and then told
both Trevor and Aaron to run into the nearby woods and not look back
or he would shoot them. 46 The boys glanced back while running away

and saw the man grab Jacob's arm, but when they looked back again
once they reached
the woods, both the gunman and Jacob were nowhere
47
seen.
be
to
In February 1990, Jacob's parents established the Jacob Wetterling

Foundation (the "Foundation") in Minnesota. 48 The following year, the
Foundation successfully lobbied the Minnesota legislature for sex
offender registration, leading to the state's Sex Offender Registration
Act, which was passed in 1991 and requires convicted sex offenders to
register with local law enforcement. 49 The Foundation earned public
(Minneapolis), June 17, 2003, at IB; Pat Doyle, After 3 Long Years, Wetterlings Renew Plea; Still
No Suspect in Son Jacob's Abduction, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 23, 1992, at LB. However,
authorities presume that the attacker was a pedophile. Pat Doyle, Wetterlings Fight To Keep
Hope Alive; Computer Picture Shows an Older Jacob, STAR TRIB., Oct. 20, 1991, at lB.
45. JACOB'S STORY, supra note 44 (describing the story of Jacob's abduction).
46. Id.
47. Id. Although the authorities never captured Jacob's abductor, they maintained a strong
suspicion that the abductor was a local person. See Rogers Worthington, Shock Dims, Hope's
Strong 7 Months After Boy's Kidnapping, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1990, at 4C, available at 1990 WL
2909919.
48. JACOB
WETTERLING
FOUND.,
HISTORY
OF JWF,
at http://www.jwf.org/
jwfabout.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter HISTORY OF JWF]. The Foundation was
established in response to Jacob's abduction. See Logan, supra note 43, at 1287 (examining the
"moral panic" that resulted from Jacob's abduction); Richardson, supra note 4, at 252 (discussing
the establishment of the Jacob Wetterling Foundation).
The Foundation is a non-profit
organization established to help "find missing children and educate children, teens, parents,
caregivers and teachers about personal safety." HISTORY OF JWF, supra. The foundation's
mission is to "protect the nation's children from sexual exploitation and abduction and 'to focus
national attention on missing children and their families."' Richardson, supra note 4, at 252 &
n.98 (quoting JACOB'S STORY, supra note 44)); see also JACOB WETrERLING FOUND., JWF
ONLINE, at http://www.jwf.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (providing the history of the
Foundation and its current initiatives, goals, and programs).
49. MINN. STAT. § 243.166(a) (2003).
A person shall register under this section if:
(1) the person was charged with or petitioned for a felony violation of or attempt
to violate any of the following, and convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that
offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances:
(i) murder... ; or
(ii) kidnapping ... ; or
(iii) criminal sexual conduct... ; or
(iv) indecent exposure...
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support as it additionally lobbied for similar federal legislation that
would require each state to develop a registration requirement for

convicted sex offenders. 50 In 1994, the Foundation achieved this goal
when the Wetterling Act became law. 5 1

Congress enacted the

Wetterling Act within the Federal 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill, as Title
XVII of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

(4) the person was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for.., violating a law
of the United States ....
similar to the offenses described in clause (1), (2), or (3).
Id.; see also ACT HISTORY, supra note 42.
1991-Minnesota's Sex Offender Registration Act-The first legislative initiative of
the Jacob Wetterling Foundation. When Jacob was abducted in October 1989, law
enforcement had no comprehensive list of sex offenders to work from. The leads
received by investigators became the basis of an extensive computerized database. The
Act went into effect 7/1/9 1.
Id.; Richardson, supra note 4, at 252 ("Prior to th[e] statute's enactment, Minnesota law
enforcement agencies lacked the resources necessary to identify known sex offenders residing in
the state."). The Foundation was instrumental in getting the legislation passed. JACOB
WETTERLING FOUND., JWF's ROLE IN COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW AND POLICY, at
http://www.jwf.org/jwflegislation.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) ("The Jacob Wetterling
Foundation was intricately involved in the development and passage of Minnesota's notification
law. Representatives from the Foundation testified at the legislature and provided research to key
legislators.").
50. Richardson, supra note 4, at 252; see also Gordon Dillow, Struggling To Stay Together;
Activism: Groups Formed After Child Kidnappings and Murders Frequently Fade Away After a
Few Years, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at El ("[T]he foundation, which emphasizes education to
prevent child abductions and has fought for a national convicted child molester registration act,
has an annual budget of about $188,000, a full-time staff of three-including Patty Wetterling,
who is not paid-and a core of about 20 volunteers."), available at 1994 WL 2123047. While
Congress considered such legislation, other states noted its potential benefits. See Editorial,
Keeping Track of Child Molesters, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 6, 1994, at A10, available at
1994 WL 4476965.
Now there is a national move to crack down on these sexual predators of children
by doing a better job of keeping track of them. In recent years, 25 states have passed
registration laws requiring convicted sex offenders to notify police of where they live.
Georgia is not one of them. Georgia lawmakers, unfortunately, rarely worry as much
about child victims' rights as they do about criminals' rights.
But if Congress passes the $22 billion crime bill now before it, Georgia's
Legislature will be forced to act. A provision of the bill, called the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children Registration Act, would require all convicted child abusers to
register and maintain their address with state law enforcement agencies for 10 years
after their release from prison. The bill is named for an 11-year-old who was abducted
at gunpoint four years ago in Minnesota. Jacob has never been found.
Critics say such laws violate an offender's right to privacy long after he's paid his
debt to society. But a child's right to protection far outweighs a criminal's right to
privacy, particularly if that criminal is the kind most likely to rape or kill again.
Id.
51. ACT HISTORY, supra note 42 ("[This act] [m]andates that each state create a very narrowly
drawn, specific program to register sex offenders. The compliance deadline was 9/30/97.").
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1994.52 The Act requires states to create and maintain registries of
those individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes
52. Richardson, supra note 4, at 252-53; see also Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071). See generally MATSON, supra note 8 (discussing
Congress's passage of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act). The statute states in part:
(a)(l) State guidelines
The Attorney General shall establish guidelines for State programs that require(A) a person who is convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense to register a current
address for the time period specified in subparagraph (A) of subsection (b)(6) of
this section; and
(B) a person who is a sexually violent predator to register a current address unless
such requirement is terminated under subparagraph (B) of subsection (b)(6) of
this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1407 1(a)(I)(A)-(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
(a)(3) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(A) The term "criminal offense against a victim who is a minor" means any
criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is
comparable to or which exceeds the following range of offenses:
(i) kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent;
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent;
(iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a minor;
(iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct;
(v) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
(vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution;
(vii) any conduct that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor ....
Id. § 14071(a)(3)(A)(i)-(vii).
(b)(2) Transfer of information to State and FBI; participation in National Sex Offender
Registry
(A) State reporting
State procedures shall ensure that the registration information is promptly made
available to a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person
expects to reside and entered into the appropriate State records or data system.
State procedures shall also ensure that conviction data and fingerprints for
persons required to register are promptly transmitted to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(B) National reporting
A State shall participate in the national database established under section
14072(b) of this title in accordance with guidelines issued by the Attorney
General, including transmission of current address information and other
information on registrants to the extent provided by the guidelines.
Id. § 14071(b)(2)(A)-(B).
(b)(6) Length of registration
A person required to register under subsection (a)(1) of this section shall continue to
comply with this section, except during ensuing periods of incarceration, until(A) 10 years have elapsed since the person was released from prison or placed on
parole, supervised release, or probation; or
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against children. 53 Further, states must maintain heightened registration
requirements for highly dangerous sex offenders. 54 The Wetterling Act

requires offenders to verify their addresses once a year for a period of
ten years and requires sexually violent predators to verify their
addresses four times per year for life. 55 A state's failure to establish

these registration programs will subject it to a ten percent reduction of
Byrne formula grant funding, federal funding that is meant to aid and
improve law enforcement agencies. 56 The Center for Sex Offender

Management ("CSOM"), an organization developed by the United
States Department of Justice to help facilitate community management
of sex offenders, 57 considers the Wetterling Act the beginning of the
(B) for the life of that person if that person(i) has 1 or more prior convictions for an offense described in subsection
(a)(1)(A) of this section; or
(ii) has been convicted of an aggravated offense described in subsection
(a)(l)(A) of this section; or
(iii) has been determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to
subsection (a)(2) of this section.
Id. § 1407 i(b)(6)(A)-(B).
53. See MATSON, supra note 8 (setting out the state requirements contained within the
Wetterling Act). Juvenile offenders may be included in this registry, but states are not required to
include such offenders unless they have been convicted of a sexual offense as adults. Id.
54. Id. The Act requires that an offender register for life if the offender "(i) has [one] or more
prior convictions for" a criminal offense against a minor or for a sexually violent offense, or "(ii)
has been convicted of an aggravated [criminal] offense" against a minor or has been convicted of
an aggravated sexually violent offense, or (iii) has been deemed a sexually violent predator. 42
U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(i)-(iii). The Act defines a sexually violent predator as "a person who
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent
offenses." 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(C).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(I)(A)-(B), (b)(6)(A)-(B).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 3750 (2000) ("The grant programs established under this subchapter shall
be known as the 'Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
Programs."'); id. § 3756 (providing for the allocation and distribution of Byrne funds); id.
§ 14071(g)(2)(A) ("A State that fails to implement the program as described in this section shall
not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the State under section
3756 of this title."); see also MATSON, supra note 8 (discussing the imposition of this penalty).
The Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, monitors states' compliance with the
Wetterling Act, and any fund reduction is reallocated to states that are in compliance with the
Act. Id.; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., Virginia's Court-appointed
Attorneys Fees and Resources, CHAMPION, May 1998, at 11 ("Administered by the Justice
Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Edward Byrne Memorial Formula Grant Program
provides funding to state and local criminal justice systems to improve police, prosecution,
defense and court programs.").
57. See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., ABOUT CSOM, at http://www.csom.org/about/
about.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
In November 1996, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), U.S. Department of Justice,
convened the National Summit: Promoting Public Safety through the Effective
Management of Sex Offenders in the Community. The summit sought input from over
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registration and tracking system for58 individuals convicted of crimes

against minors or violent sex crimes.
Critics soon attacked the Wetterling Act because it only provided for
registration and tracking at the government level and did not mandate
the dissemination of this information to the public. 5 9 Instead, the Act
gave the state law enforcement authorities discretion as to whether or

not to notify the public of a sex offender in the community. 60 This
changed, however, after the 1994 murder of seven-year-old Megan
Kanka in New Jersey by a neighbor who was a convicted sex
offender. 6 1 After the murder, Megan's mother and other concerned
citizens petitioned the New Jersey legislature to enact a law requiring

notice to the community

of sexual offenders living in their

neighborhoods. 6 2

On October 31, 1994, then New Jersey Governor
Christine Todd Whitman signed the first Megan's Law, which required
that the public be notified when convicted sex offenders reside within
the community. 6 3 Megan's murder also triggered a public outcry for
more stringent federal legislation. 64 The United States Congress reacted
180 practitioners, academic researchers, and other experts regarding the most effective
management strategies for this challenging offender population. Participants were also
asked about the information, training, and other needs of their-colleagues working in
this field. In response to their recommendations, OJP, the National Institute of
Corrections (NIC), and the State Justice Institute (SJI) created the Center for Sex
Offender Management.
Id.
58. Richardson, supra note 4, at 253. See generally MATSON, supra note 8 (discussing the
history of the registration and tracking systems for sexual offenders).
59. Richardson, supra note 4, at 253.
60. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 166.
61. Id. On July 29, 1994, Megan's neighbor Jesse Timmendequas invited her into his home to
see his puppy and raped and murdered her. Id.; Richardson, supra note 4, at 253-54.
Timmendequas was twice convicted of sexual offenses against children. Garfinkle, supra note 9,
at 166. Later, it was "reported that 'Megan's parents believe[d] that if they had known that a
pedophile lived nearby, this heinous crime would never have happened."' Richardson, supra note
4, at 254 (quoting ScoTr MATSON, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION AND EDUCATION 3, available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/notedu.pdf (Apr.
2001)).
62. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 166.
63. Id. This law was codified in sections 2C:7-1 through 2C:7-19 of the New Jersey Statutes.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-19 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003). The statute states in part
that "[a] person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of
insanity for commission of a sex offense ...shall register as provided in ... this section." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(a). Throughout this Note, the term "Megan's Law" is used to refer
generally to both federal and state sex offender registration and notification laws.
64. See Fred Bayles, Murder Renews Callsfor Sex Crime Registry, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 8,
1994, at 3, availableat 1994 WL 5528040.
The response was immediate. A rally in Hamilton Township, a suburb of Trenton,
heard calls for 'Megan's Law.' Gov. Christine [Todd] Whitman voiced support. U.S.
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to this outcry with an amendment to the Wetterling Act. 65 In May 1996,
Congress passed this amendment and President William Clinton signed
66
it into law, thus creating the first federal Megan's Law.
The federal Megan's Law amended the Wetterling Act to read "shall
release" instead of "may release," thereby requiring states and state
agencies to release any information about registered sex offenders
necessary for public safety. 67 The statute does not specify what
information states should provide to the public, but rather uses the term
"relevant information." 68 Further, states may decide how to disseminate
the information, and can choose to notify the public through mailings,

press releases, or community meetings, or to make the information
available to the community upon request.69 This requirement sought to
ensure that the public could obtain information necessary to protect
them from sex offenders in the community. 70
Generally, such

Rep. Christopher Smith went on the House floor to demand that the crime bill before
Congress be amended to require sex offenders to register with local police.
Id. Rep. Smith stated in his remarks to Congress:
I plan to introduce legislation that would require community notification. I know my
bill faces an uphill fight. But the memory of Megan Kanka, the extreme agony her
parents and family must now endure, and the prevention of tragedies like this in the
future demands no less than full disclosure to communities when sexual predators are
released back into our communities.
140 CONG. REC. H6560 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Rep. Smith).
65. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 167; Richardson, supra note 4, at 254. The amendment was
drafted by a New Jersey representative at the time, Dick Zimmer. Id. For the specific text of this
amendment, see infra note 66.
66. Richardson, supra note 4, at 254; see Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)). "Megan's Law" was an amendment to the
Wetterling Act that provided for community notification of a sex offender's presence, and states
in part as codified:
e) Release of information
(1) The information collected under a State registration program may be disclosed
for any purpose permitted under the laws of the State.
(2) The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person
required to register under this section, except that the identity of a victim of an
offense that requires registration under this section shall not be released. The
release of information under this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an
Internet site containing such information that is available to the public and
instructions on the process for correcting information that a person alleges to be
erroneous.
42 U.S.C. § 1407 1(e) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
67. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 167; Richardson, supra note 4, at 255.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e); see supra note 66 (quoting pertinent provisions of this section). See
generally Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 167 (discussing the Jacob Wetterling Act).
69. Richardson, supra note 4, at 255.
70. Id. at254-55,255n.116.
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notification statutes safeguard the private information of convicted sex
sanctifying the public dissemination of
offenders while simultaneously
71
such information.
Later in 1996, Congress again amended the Wetterling Act through
the enactment of the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and
Identification Act of 1996 ("Lyncher Act"). 72 The Lyncher Act created
a federal database for registration information and increased registration
requirements for repeat and aggravated offenders. 73 Additionally, the
Lyncher Act imposed a lifetime registration requirement on offenders
who are (1) twice convicted of committing a criminal offense against a

minor, (2) twice convicted of committing a sexually violent offense, (3)
convicted 74of aggravated sexual abuse, or (4) deemed sexually violent
predators.
In response to crimes committed against children by convicted sex
offenders, state legislatures followed the example set by Congress and
the New Jersey legislature and passed their own versions of Megan's
Law. 7 5 By 1996, every state had enacted a sex offender registration and
71. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1822 ("Notification statutes serve as both gatekeepers to
confidential information about released offenders and as catalysts for publication of information
about potentially dangerous members of the community.").
72. Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14072). The statute as codified provides in part that
[t]he Attorney General shall establish a national database at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to track the whereabouts and movement of- (1) each person who has
been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor; (2) each person
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (3) each person who is a
sexually violent predator.
42 U.S.C. 14072(b)(1)-(3) (2000).
73. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 167; SCOTT MATSON, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT.,
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION AND EDUCATION, at http://www.csom.org/pubs/notedu.html (Apr.
2001); see also Kenneth W. Birrell, Criminal Law and Procedure: Sex Offender Lifetime
Registration Law, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1112, 1114 (2001) ("The Lyncher Amendment requires
lifetime registration for two categories of convicted sex offenders: (1) those who have a prior
conviction for an offense for which registration is required, and (2) those who have been
convicted of an aggravated offense."). The legislature named the amendment in honor of Pam
Lyncher, an anticrime activist tragically killed in a plane crash. Daniel M. Filler, Making the
Casefor Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 330 n.95 (2001).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(d)(2). "Aggravated sexual abuse" includes, among other things, sexual
acts accompanied by force or threats, as well as any sexual act with a minor under the age of
twelve. 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2002). The Act defines a sexually violent predator as "a person who
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent
offenses." 42 U.S.C. § 14072(a)(2) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1407 1(a)(3)(C)).
75. Richardson, supra note 4, at 239. For example, the Oklahoma Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration Act, passed on June 1, 2001, is an example of such an act. Id. The Oklahoma Act
was passed partly in response to the murder of seven-year-old Kristi Blevins by a neighborhood
convicted juvenile sex offender in 2000. Id. at 237-39. The Washington state sex offender
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community notification statute. 7 6 Many of the state Megan's Laws
include juvenile sex offenders, 77 but only twenty-eight states expressly
apply the laws to juvenile sex offenders. 7 8 Sixteen states and the
District of Columbia have statutes that do not address whether juvenile
registration and notification act was passed after public outrage resulting from an attack on a
seven-year-old boy by Earl Shriner, a convicted child molester. Kirsten R. Bredlie, Keeping
Children Out of Double Jeopardy: An Assessment of Punishment and Megan's Law in Doe v.
Poritz, 81 MINN. L. REV. 501, 504 (1996).
76. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 167 & nn.98-101. To examine specific state sex offender
registration laws, see ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20 to -38 (Supp. 2003); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010.100 (Michie 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3821(D) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to
-920 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 16-22-101 to -114 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-250 to -251 (West 2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4120-4122 (2001 & Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN § 944.606(1)(B) (West
2001 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-12, 42-9-44.1 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E1(9) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-8401 to -8413 (Michie Supp. 2003); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
150/1-150/12 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12-14 (West 2002); IOWA CODE
§ 692A.2(4) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4912 (1995 & Supp. 2001); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500-991 (Michie 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.540-991 (West Supp.
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11221-11228 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 11-701 to -721 (2001 & Supp. 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (1999);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 28.728 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to -33-57 (2000 & Supp. 2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 589.400 (2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -23-520 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to -4013 (2000); NEV.
REV. STAT. 179D.350-.490 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-B:1 to -B:10 (Supp. 2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1-2C:7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-I
to -8 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-v (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2004); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5-.32 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1997 & Supp. 2003); OH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 582(c) (2002); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 181.594-.606 (Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.1(a) (2001); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to 37.1-19 (2002 & Supp. 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -3-530
(Law Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31 to -22-41 (Michie 1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 38-6-101, 40-39-101 to -39-111 (2003); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 62.4
(Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-27-21.5 to -21.10 (1999 & Supp. 2001); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (1998 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-900 to -920
(Michie Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(l) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-12-1
to -12-10 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. § 301.45 (1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19301 to -19-307 (Michie 2003).
77. Richardson, supra note 4, at 240 & n.26. These laws are not always clear in their
applicability. See Stacey Hiller, Note, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The
Detrimental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 278 (1998) ("State
registration statutes are complex and confusing with respect to the individuals required to register,
particularly, whether juvenile sex offenders must register."); see also In re J.G., 777 A.2d 891,
906-07 & nn.l-5 (N.J. 2001) (discussing the application of state registration laws to juvenile
offenders).
78. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 177-78 ("[Tlhe laws of twenty-eight states and the federal
Megan's Law specifically require registration and community notification for juveniles
adjudicated delinquent for certain crimes."). These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at
177 n.98. To examine these states' sex offender registration laws, see supra note 76.
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offenders are subject to registration requirements, leaving this issue for
the courts to decide. 79 Five states have statutes that do subject juveniles
convicted as adults for sexual crimes to the registration requirement, but

do not address whether juveniles adjudicated, rather than convicted as
adults, must register. 80 New Mexico is the only state that has a statute
81
that specifically excludes juveniles from registering.
Those states that do subject juvenile sex offenders to registration

requirements differ in their determinations of when juveniles must
register. 82 Some state laws require registration only when the state has
adjudicated the juvenile of a specific number of offenses. 83 For
example, Mississippi does not require a juvenile offender to register
until he or she has committed and been found twice delinquent of a sex
offense or an attempted sex offense, which courts refer to as a "wait and
see" approach. 84 Other states look to the evidence surrounding the
offense. 85 For instance, Indiana's statute considers the age of the
offender and the evidence surrounding the offense, requiring that the
offender be at least fourteen, have committed an offense that would be
considered a sex offense if committed by an adult, and that the state

79. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 178. These states are Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at n.99. To examine these states' sex offender
registration laws, see supra note 76. To examine the D.C. statute, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 224001 (2001).
80. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 178. These states are Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, and
Virginia. Id. at 178 n.100. To examine these states' sex offender registration laws, see supra
note 76.
81. Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 178; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11 A-3 (noting that a sex
offender is a person eighteen years of age or older).
82. Richardson, supra note 4, at 256; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 508-10 (discussing
different state approaches to juvenile offenders); Mark J. Swearingen, Comment, Megan's Law as
Applied to Juveniles: Protecting Children at the Expense of Children?, 7 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 525, 569-74 (1997) (examining the treatment of juvenile sex offenders in different states).
For example, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Montana, and North Dakota all allow the courts discretion in determining if a juvenile sex
offender is required to register. Richardson, supra note 4, at 256; see, e.g., In re S.M.M., 558
N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997) (applying this judicial discretion method in requiring a juvenile sex
offender to register); Roe v. Att'y Gen., 750 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Mass. 2001) (discussing the
judicial discretion method).
83. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (stating that "any person
residing in this state who has been ... twice adjudicated delinquent for any sex offense or
attempted sex offense shall register with the Mississippi Department of Public Safety.").
84. Id.; Richardson, supra note 4, at 261.
85. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4(b) (West 2002) (stating that a juvenile offender may
not have to register if the state can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is not
likely to re-offend).
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present clear and convincing evidence that the offender is likely to reoffend.8 6
Lastly, some state laws subject juveniles to the registration

requirement only until the juvenile can show by clear and convincing
evidence that it would be in the public's best interest to release him
from registration. 87 Although New Jersey's statute generally requires
juvenile sex offenders who have been adjudicated delinquent of more
than one sex offense to register for life,88 the statute also allows the
offender to apply to end the registration requirement after fifteen years
if the offender has not committed another sex offense. 89 However, the

registration requirement for juvenile offenders who are under the age of
fourteen ends when the offender turns eighteen if the New Jersey Law
Division, upon the production of clear and convincing evidence by the
offender, determines that the juvenile does not pose a threat to the
community. 90 Washington allows juveniles who were at least fifteen
when they committed the offense to avoid the registration requirement
if they show by clear and convincing evidence that requiring their
86. Id.; Richardson, supra note 4, at 259 (describing Indiana's method for determining
whether juvenile sex offenders should be required to register, noting that there must be "clear and
convincing evidence that proves a likelihood of subsequent offenses."). The statute reads:
The term [offender] includes a child who has committed a delinquent act and (1) who
is at least fourteen (14) years of age; (2) is on probation, is on parole, or is discharged
from a facility by the department of correction, is discharged from a secure private
facility .... or is discharged from a juvenile detention facility as a result of an
adjudication as a delinquent child for an act that would be an offense described in
subsection (a) if committed by an adult; and (3) is found by a court by clear and
convincing evidence to be likely to repeat an act that would be an offense described in
subsection (a) if committed by an adult.
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4(b); see also K.J.P. v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that this standard was met by two psychiatrists' testimony that K.J.P., a juvenile
sex offender, had a high risk of re-offense).
87. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(f)-(g) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003) (stating that a
person required to register can apply to have the requirement terminated if he proves that he has
not re-offended within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility,
whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.140(4) (2000) ("The court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register for a sex
offense... that was committed while the petitioner was fifteen years of age or older only if the
petitioner shows, with clear and convincing evidence, that future registration of the petitioner will
not serve the purposes of [Washington's sex offender registration statute].")
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(a)(1); Richardson, supra note 4, at 259-60. Under the statute,
offenders who have only committed one sex offense may petition to end registration if they have
not committed another offense fifteen years from the date registration began, but those who have
committed more than one offense are not able to cease registration. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:72(f)-(g).
89. Richardson, supra note 4, at 260.
90. Id. See generally infra note 219 (discussing the New Jersey case In re J.G., which
reviewed the registration requirement for juvenile offenders).
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registration will not serve the legislative intent of the statute.9 1 The
state allows a juvenile offender aged fourteen or younger at the time of
the offense to register for only two years and ends the requirement after
that time if the offender did not re-offend during that period and can

prove by a preponderance of evidence
that continued registration will
92
not serve the purpose of the statute.
Other states leave the issue for the courts to determine. 9 3 Hawaii's
statute, for example, does not specifically include juvenile sex offenders
who are "adjudicated delinquent," but it is possible that the courts can
apply the requirement to a juvenile who falls within the statutory
definition of a "sex offender." 94 It is left to the Hawaii courts to
construe the statute to determine whether juvenile offenders
should be
95
registration.
to
subject
thus
and
offenders
sex
considered
B. The SORA: Illinois' Megan's Law
The SORA, Illinois' Megan's Law, is the state's primary legislation
on sex offender registration requirements, enacted in response to sexual
crimes against children. 96 The Illinois legislature enacted the original

91.
92.

WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(4); Swearingen, supra note 82, at 573.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(4); Swearingen, supra note 82, at 573. The statute states:
The court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register for a sex offense.., that
was committed while the petitioner was under the age of fifteen if the petitioner (i) has
not been adjudicated of any additional sex offenses or kidnapping offenses during the
twenty-four months following the adjudication for the offense giving rise to the duty to
register, and (ii) proves by a preponderance of the evidence that future registration of
the petitioner will not serve the purposes of [Washington's sex offender registration
statute].
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(4); see also State v. Heiskell, 916 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Wash.
1996) (noting that "the legislative history... [of the act] suggest[s] a legislative intent to provide
a lower burden of proof for waiver of the registration requirement for younger juveniles.").
93. Lee, supra note 4, at 508-09; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1(9) (1999) (providing
Hawaii's definition of a "sex offender").
94. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1(9) (providing a definition of "sex offender" that could
encompass an offender who is a juvenile, though not referring specifically to juvenile sex
offenders); Lee, supra note 4, at 508-09.
95. Lee, supra note 4, at 510-12. Hawaii courts must construe the statute in accordance with
the legislature's intent. See State v. Toyomura, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (Haw. 1995) (noting that in
construing a statute, the court must determine and give effect to the legislative intent).
96. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-150/12 (2002 & West Supp. 2003); Jessica R. Ball,
Comment, Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame:" Child Sex Offender Community
Notification in Illinois, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 422 (1996) (noting that the Illinois General
Assembly enacted the state's first registration statute "[iln reaction to a proliferation of sex crimes
against children"); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the SORA). The
development of such a law to prevent sexual abuse of children is supported by the observation
that "[c]hild sexual abuse was 'rediscovered' in the late 1970s and early 1980s" after being
dismissed earlier in the century by Dr. Sigmund Freud. Tara Ney, Foreword to TRUE AND FALSE
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version of the SORA in 1986 as the Habitual Child Sex Offender
Registration Act. 97 Since the SORA's enactment, the legislature has
amended it several times. 98 The original statute required sex offenders
who had been convicted of at least two sex offenses against a victim
under age eighteen to register. 99 The intent of the legislature was to
10 0
protect the state's children from repeat offenders.
However, the 1986 version of the Act did not prove effective, and in
1992, the kidnapping and murder of a six-year-old girl and the resulting
public outcry inspired the legislature to expand the Act to compel

registration after a first offense.10 1 In 1995, the murders of two other
children prompted the legislature to amend the registration statute once
again to provide for community notification. 10 2 In 1998, the Illinois
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT, at xv (Tara
Ney ed., 1995).
97. Ball, supra note 96, at 422. The Illinois sex offender registration law originally was
entitled the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act when first enacted on August 15, 1986.
Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act. No. 84-1279, 1986 Ill. Laws 1467. The
name of the law was changed to "Child Sex Offender Registration Act" upon the enactment of
Public Act. 87-1064, effective January 1, 1993, and to the current "Sex Offender Registration
Act" by Public Act. 89-8, effective January 1, 1996. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 (2002) (noting
amendments to the Act's title).
98. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments to the original
registration law).
99. Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act. No. 84-1279, 1986 I11.Laws 1467
(codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-150/12); see also Ball, supra note 96, at
422 & n. 129 (discussing the original act).
100. Ball, supra note 96, at 422 & n.130 ("'[T]his kind of legislation will help our law
enforcement agencies stop this kind of carnage on our children. Society demands that we protect
[our] ... children."' (quoting House Proceedings,84th I11.Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 209 (1986))).
101. Id. at 422-23 & nn.132-33 (discussing the legislature's motivation for amending the
statute). The abduction and murder of Kahla Lansing primarily motivated the legislature:
Six-year-old Kahla Lansing disappeared on September 28, 1991. Police discovered
Kahla's body two weeks later in an abandoned grain storage bin in eastern Iowa.
Twenty-nine-year-old Jeffrey Rissley admitted to kidnapping Kahla, molesting her,
and finally strangling her with an electrical cord. Rissley had previously served time in
a Texas prison following conviction on two counts of child molestation in that state.
Moreover, Rissley sexually assaulted another child in Galesburg, Illinois before
kidnapping Kahla.
Id. at 423 n.133 (citations omitted).
102. Child Sex Offender Community Notification Law, Pub. Act. No. 89-428, 1995 Ill. Laws
4453 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101-152/130) (establishing notification
provisions); Michael Gillis, Bill To Name Sex Offenders in Community Passes House, CHI. SUNTIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at 5 ("This year's murders of 10-year-old Christopher Meyer of the
Kankakee area and 3-year-old Sara Kramer of Decatur prompted lawmakers to give the bill
immediate attention in the veto session."), available at 1995 WL 6678842. On August 7, 1995,
ten-year-old Christopher Meyer of Kankakee, Illinois, was murdered by a man who had
previously been jailed for murdering a five-year-old girl. Ball, supra note 96, at 401-02. Sara
Kramer was three when she disappeared from her bed in the middle of the night. Three Years
Later, Death of DecaturGirlIs Still Being Investigated,ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1998,
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legislature further amended the statute to include a separate definition of

a "juvenile sex offender" in the definitions section, whereas there
10 3

previously had been no specific mention of a juvenile offender.
However, the legislature changed this in 2002, when an amendment to
the statute included "juvenile sex offenders" as a specific type of "sex
offender" in the statute's definition of a "sex offender" and eliminated
the separate juvenile sex offender definition subsection.104 After the
2002 amendment, the SORA's definition of a sex offender included any
5

10
juvenile adjudicated delinquent for the commission of a sex offense.

at B5. Her body was found in the Sangamon River four days later. Id. The authorities never
solved the case. Id. Prior to this amendment, communities were not notified when a registered
sex offender resided in the area. See Gillis, supra, at 5 ("[Plolice are now prohibited from giving
the names [of convicted offenders] to the community. The bill, proposed by Rep. Gwenn
Klinger... opens the records to the public and requires police to deliver the names to schools,
child-care facilities and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services."). See
generally infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting the law).
103. Act of June 30, 1999, Pub. Act. No. 91-48, § 5, 1999 I11.Laws 1279, 1281 (codified as
amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A-5)). This amendment was effective July 1, 1999, and
created section 2(A-5), which separately defined a "juvenile sex offender." See 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 150/2(A-5) (1998). This version, as codified, read as follows:
(A-5) "Juvenile sex offender" means any person who is adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent as the result of the commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth
in item (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a violation of any substantially similar
federal, sister state, or foreign country law. For purposes of this Section, "convicted"
shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated."
Id. § 150/2(A-5). This amendment was proposed as House Bill 2721. H.R. 2721, 91st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 1999). Based on the debates in the Illinois House and Senate over
House Bill 2721, this amendment was designed to add separate definitions to the SORA,
including that of a juvenile sex offender, and, as noted by Senator Klemm, "impose[] registration
requirements of those persons." Senate Proceedings, 91st 111.Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 52
(1999). Further, Representative Klinger stated in the House debates on the bill that "it also
requires juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent to register." House Proceedings, 91st Gen.
Assemb., ist Sess. 143 (1999).
104. Act of Aug. 22, 2002, Pub. Act. No. 92-828, § 5 (codified at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
150/2). This amendment, effective August 22, 2002, created section 2(A)(5), which listed the
characteristics of a juvenile sex offender, as defined by the previous section 2(A-5), as a subset of
the definition of a "sex offender" and eliminated section 2(A-5). Id. § 5 (codified in pertinent
part at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)(5)); see infra note 105 (quoting section 2(A)(5)).
105. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)(5) (2002). This amendment defines a "sex offender" as
[any person who is] adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of committing or
attempting to commit an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute any of
the offenses specified in item (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a violation of any
substantially similar federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister state, or foreign
country law, or found guilty under Article V of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 of
committing or attempting to commit an act which, if committed by an adult, would
constitute any of the offenses specified in item (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a
violation of any substantially similar federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister
state, or foreign country law.
Id. As noted above, this amendment removed the separate definition of a juvenile sex offender
and moved it to a subsection of the definition of a sex offender. See supra notes 102-05 and

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

Specifically, the SORA requires a person defined as a sex offender or
sexual predator under the Act to register his or her current address,
place of employment, and school attended with local law
enforcement. 10 6 The SORA's definition of sexual predators includes

offenders who have committed specified sex offenses, including
aggravated criminal sexual assault. 10 7 Additionally, the SORA requires
that sexual predators register for life, whereas other offenders need only
108
register for ten years.

accompanying text. A sex offense includes aggravated criminal sexual assault under the SORA.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(B)(1).
106. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3(a)(1)-(2). The statute requires that
[a] sex offender, as defined in Section 2 of this Act, or sexual predator shall, within the
time period prescribed in subsections (b) and (c), register in person and provide
accurate information as required by the Department of State Police. Such information
shall include current address, current place of employment, and school attended. The
sex offender or sexual predator shall register:
(1) with the chief of police in each of the municipalities in which he or she attends
school, is employed, resides or is temporarily domiciled for a period of time of 10 or
more days, unless the municipality is the City of Chicago, in which case he or she shall
register at the Chicago Police Department Headquarters; or
(2) with the sheriff in each of the counties in which he or she attends school, is
employed, resides or is temporarily domiciled in an unincorporated area or, if
incorporated, no police chief exists.
Id.
107. Id. § 150/2(E)(1) ("As used in this Article, 'sexual predator' means any person who, after
July 1, 1999, is... [c]onvicted for an offense of federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister
state, or foreign country law that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in subsection (E)
of this Section .... "). The statute also provides that sexual predators are those offenders (i)
convicted of first degree murder where the victim was under eighteen years old and the offender
was at least seventeen years old, (ii) certified as a sexually dangerous person, (iii) found to be a
sexually violent person, or (iv) convicted of a second or subsequent offense requiring registration.
Id. § 150/2(E)(2)-(5).
108. Id. § 150/7.
[Sexual predators must] register for the period of his or her natural life after conviction
or adjudication if not confined to a penal institution, hospital, or other institution or
facility, and if confined, for the period of his or her natural life after parole, discharge,
or release from any such facility. Any other person who is required to register under
this Article shall be required to register for a period of 10 years after conviction or
adjudication if not confined to a penal institution, hospital or other institution or
facility, and if confined, for a period of 10 years after parole, discharge or release from
any such facility.... Liability for registration terminates at the expiration of 10 years
from the date of conviction or adjudication if not confined to a penal institution,
hospital or any other institution or facility and if confined, at the expiration of 10 years
from the date of parole, discharge or release from any such facility, providing such
person does not, during that period, again become liable to register under the
provisions of this Article.
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Additionally, in 1995 the Illinois legislature passed the Child Sex

Offender and Community Notification Law (the "Notification Law"). 109
The Notification Law separately defines juvenile sex offenders as
juveniles adjudicated of specified violations, including aggravated
criminal assault. 110 This statute provides for public notification of
information about convicted sexual offenders or sexual predators in the
community.1 11 The Notification Law further restricts the dissemination

of information pertaining to juvenile sex offenders by only releasing
such information when 12the juvenile offender compromises the safety of
a person in some way.'

C. The Prohibitionon Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Due
Process Clause in the United States Constitution
While sexual offender registration laws, such as the SORA, now exist
in all states, these laws are not without limits. 113 Two provisions of the
United States Constitution regulate and greatly limit the scope of such

109. Child Sex Offender and Community Notification Law, Pub. Act. No. 89-428, 1995 I11.
Laws 4453 (codified as amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/101-152/130).
110. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/105.
"Juvenile sex offender" means any person who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as
the result of the commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth in item (B),
(C), or (C-5) of Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act, or a violation of any
substantially similar federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister state, or foreign
country law, and whose adjudication occurred on or after the effective date of the
amendatory Act of the 91 st General Assembly.
Id. (citations omitted).

I11. Id.§ 152/120(b)(l)-(5).
The Department of State Police and any law enforcement agency may disclose, in the
Department's or agency's discretion, the following information to any person likely to
encounter a sex offender, or sexual predator:
(1) The offender's name, address, and date of birth.
(2) The offense for which the offender was convicted.
(3) Adjudication as a sexually dangerous person.
(4) The offender's photograph or any such information that will help identify the sex
offender.
(5) Offender employment information, to protect public safety.
Id.

112. Id. § 152/120(e).
The Department of State Police and any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction
may, in the Department's or agency's discretion, only provide the information
specified in subsection (b), with respect to an adjudicated juvenile delinquent, to any
person when that person's safety may be compromised for some reason related to the
juvenile sex offender.
Id.

113. See Ball, supra note 96, at 414 ("Sex offender registration and community notification
laws have been challenged on myriad federal and state constitutional grounds.").
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registration laws: the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, and the Due Process Clause. 114 Part 1 of this
section discusses the origin of the idea of cruel and unusual
punishment.1 15 Part 2 of this section examines the concept of due
116
process of law.

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment.1 1 7 The Framers of the United States
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); id. amend. V (stating
"[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); id.
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"); see also Ball, supra note 96, at 414-15 & n.80 (discussing the
constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and community notification statutes,
including claims that such statutes violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
and due process guarantees contained within the United States Constitution).
115. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing cruel and unusual punishment).
116. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing due process of law).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This ban on cruel and unusual punishment is derived from
English law. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316 (1972). The United States Supreme Court,
in Furman v. Georgia, recounted the English history that influenced the Eighth Amendment,
noting:
In 1583, John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, turned the High Commission into a
permanent ecclesiastical court, and the Commission began to use torture to extract
confessions from persons suspected of various offenses. Sir Robert Beale protested
that cruel and barbarous torture violated Magna Carta, but his protests were made in
vain.
Cruel punishments were not confined to those accused of crimes, but were
notoriously applied with even greater relish to those who were convicted. Blackstone
described in ghastly detail the myriad of inhumane forms of punishment imposed on
persons found guilty of any of a large number of offenses. Death, of course, was the
usual result.
The treason trials of 1685-the 'Bloody Assizes'-which followed an abortive
rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth, marked the culmination of the parade of horrors,
and most historians believe that it was this event that finally spurred the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights containing the progenitor of our prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments.
Id. at 316-17 (footnotes omitted). The Court also stated another historian's hypothesis for the
inclusion of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the English Bill of rights, noting,
[L]egislative history has led at least one legal historian to conclude 'that the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was, first, an objection to the
imposition of punishments that were unauthorized by statute and outside the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and second, a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties,' and not primarily a reaction to the torture of the
High Commission, harsh sentences, or the assizes.
Id. at 318 (footnotes omitted). However, in assessing the United States use of the term cruel and
unusual punishment, the court stated that
[w]hether the English Bill of Rights prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
is properly read as a response to excessive or illegal punishments, as a reaction to
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Constitution 1 18 took the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" from

the English Bill of Rights of 1689.119 This phrase in the English Bill of
Rights functioned to protect citizens from torture and medieval forms of
punishment. 120 Similarly, the Constitutional Framers included this
language within the Eighth Amendment to ensure the same protection
1
12
for the citizens of the United States.

Since the amendment's adoption, the United States Supreme Court
has defined cruel and unusual punishment broadly when deciding cases
involving punishment that is potentially cruel and unusual. 122 When a
statute is challenged under the Eighth Amendment, courts will uphold
the constitutionality of the statute if its provisions bear a reasonable
barbaric and objectionable modes of punishment, or as both, there is no doubt whatever
that in borrowing the language and in including it in the Eighth Amendment, our
Founding Fathers intended to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments.
Id. at 319 (footnotes omitted).
118. See generally Gia Fontd, Note, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School
Vouchers, Education's Winning Lottery Ticket, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 485 n.45 (2003)
(discussing the notable Framers of the United States Constitution). The Framers were the fiftyfive state delegates present at the 1787 Federal Convention who produced the United States
Constitution. Id. The Framers included George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander
Hamilton, and James Madison. Id.
119. Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender RegistrationActs: An Added Dimension to the War
on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 747 (1994).
120. Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1976) (discussing the history of
the Eighth Amendment).
121. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983). The court noted that:
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the
scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights
is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same protectionincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments.
Id.
122. Alison Chin, Hope v. Pelzer: Increasing the Accountability of State Actors in Prison
Systems-A Necessary Enterprise in Guaranteeing the Eighth Amendment Rights of Prison
Inmates, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 914 (2003); see also Houston, supra note 119, at
747 (discussing the broad interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment). For example, in Trop
v. Dulles, the Court looked to the principle that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man" in its analysis and used the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" as a guideline in its
determination of whether the expatriation and dishonorable discharge of a citizen convicted by a
military court martial of desertion from the United States Army in wartime, where there was no
attempt to give allegiance to a foreign power, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In a later case, the Court classified "cruel and unusual
punishment as any punishment 'grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,' any pain
inflicted without penological justification, or as any 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'
Chin, supra, at 915 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173). Cruel and unusual punishment by the
government can extend even to actions not taken by the government. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 1,
at 822 (noting that the government could be held accountable for cruel and unusual punishment in
the case of an incarcerated non-smoker who alleged health damage from being paired with a
smoker for a cellmate (citing to Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1993))).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

relationship to the public interest served and
it attempts to accomplish
12 3
that objective through reasonable methods.
To determine whether a law constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, courts, and specifically Illinois courts, apply a two-part

test. 124 First, courts determine whether or not the law constitutes a
punishment. 125 Courts determine whether a law is penal in nature by
looking to the purpose of the statute, including the intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute. 126 However, even if the legislative
intent is not found to be punitive in nature, the court will disregard that
legislative intent if the party challenging the statute can demonstrate
that the statute nevertheless has a punitive effect. 127 Second, if the law

is found to be a punishment, courts then must determine whether the
punishment imposed by the law is cruel and unusual because it is

123. People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ill. 1991) (citing People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d
829, 831 (Ill. 1989)).
124. Ball, supra note 96, at 415. The two part test was developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 95, 101-03 (stating that an Eighth
Amendment analysis of a sex offender registration a consists of two parts).
125. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640 ("[T]he purpose of the statute should be evaluated in order to
determine whether it is penal in nature." (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 96)).
126. Ball, supra note 96, at 416; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97 (stating the rules for
determining whether a statute is penal in nature). As the Trop noted,
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its
determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the
purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it
has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a
disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental
purpose.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96. However, even if the statute is considered nonpunitive, it can still
constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it imposes an excessive disability. See Earl-Hubbard,
supra note 1, at 816-17 ("If the law has a nonpunitive purpose, the court must assess whether the
disability or injury appears excessive in relation to this non-punitive purpose.").
127. People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 439 (Ill. 2000) ("[T]he legislature's intent will be
disregarded where the party challenging the statute demonstrates by 'the clearest proof' that the
statute's effect is so punitive that it negates the legislature's intent." (quoting Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997))). To assess whether a statute has a punitive effect even
where its intent is nonpunitive, courts generally have looked to the following factors:
(1) whether the "sanction" involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether
the sanction has been historically regarded as punishment; (3) whether the sanction
comes into play only on a finding of scienter,(4) whether operation of the sanction
will promote retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which the sanction
applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which the sanction
may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether the sanction appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
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128
grossly disproportional to the crime committed by the offender.
Courts ascertain whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to

the crime by applying a three-part test where the court considers (1) the
seriousness of the offense and the harshness of the punishment, (2) the

sentences imposed on other criminals within the jurisdiction, and (3) the
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the commission of the same
crime.129
Opponents to sex offender registration statutes such as the SORA
have challenged such statutes, contending that such laws constitute a
grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 130 However, these challenges have not been successful,
and courts have held that such statutes do not violate the Eighth
13 1
Amendment.
2. Due Process
Scholars have noted that due process is a necessary requirement for
any system of law. 132 The due process concept has its roots in AngloAmerican law. 133 The United States Constitution provides for due
process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 134 Due process of
128. Ball, supra note 96, at 415-16; see also Houston, supra note 119, at 752 (noting that "a
penalty inflicted must accord with the 'dignity of man,' and the punishment must not be 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime" (citations omitted)).
129. Ball, supra note 96, at 417. The United States Supreme Court developed this test in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991),
however, the Supreme Court split on whether the Solem decision remained good law, with two
Justices voting to overrule Solem, three Justices voting in a concurring opinion to narrow the
Solem test and only find a violation of the Eighth Amendment if the punishment was grossly
disproportionate to the crime, and four Justices voting in a dissenting opinion to uphold the Solem
test. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985 (plurality opinion); id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
1009 (White, J., dissenting).
130. See Ball, supra note 96, at 417-18 & n.95 (discussing a case that analyzed whether
registration laws constituted punishment). For an example of a case that argued that the SORA
violated the Eighth Amendment, see Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 637, and see also infra notes 176-85
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Adams case.
131. See, e.g., Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641 (holding that Illinois' registration statute did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment because its effect was nonpenal). See generally infra
notes 176-85 and accompanying text (examining the Adams decision).
132. See, e.g., J. Kevin Jenkins & John Dayton, Students, Weapons, and Due Process: An
Analysis of Zero Tolerance Policies In Public Schools, 171 WEST'S EDUC. L. RPTR. 13, 15
(2003) ("Due process of law is essential to any just system of laws, and is a necessary foundation
for any government committed to the rule of law.").
133. Id. at 15 n.18 (noting that the Magna Carta of 1215 and the English Petition of Right of
1628 contained ideas similar to that of the due process requirement provided for in the United
States Constitution).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § I (stating that "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also Michelle
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law consists of several types of rights, including fairness and limitations
on government power. 135 Courts 36recognize both procedural and
1
substantive due process rights today.

Procedural due process requires a certain level of fairness in all
governmental processes that potentially encroach on life, liberty, or
property rights. 137 Specifically, procedural due process requires that
citizens accused of violating a law must be given a fundamentally fair
hearing, with adequate notice of charges, evidence, and witnesses, and
the chance to rebut the charges, evidence, and witnesses. 138 The level
of notice required for procedural due process varies, but generally, the
139
offender must have notice that his or her conduct is illegal.
Additionally, procedural due process protects against 140
government
jury.
by
trial
a
to
right
the
for
provides
and
misuse of power
Substantive due process ensures that government actions serve a
legitimate government interest and are fair and reasonable. 14 1 Courts
look to fundamental rights to assess whether a due process analysis

Leigh Carter, Note, Giving Taxpatriates the Boot-Permanently?: The Reed Amendment
Unconstitutionally Infringes on the FundamentalRight to Expatriate, 36 GA. L. REv. 835, 846
(2002) (noting that both amendments provide for due process of law).
135. Jenkins & Dayton, supra note 132, at 16 ("Within the broad array of rights associated
with due process are requirements of notice and hearing, fundamental fairness, proportionality,
and other limitations on the arbitrary, unfair, or corrupt use of governmental power.").
136. Id.
137. Id. ("In its most basic form procedural due process guarantees adequate notice of
government actions affecting life, liberty, or property, and the right to a fair hearing regarding
these issues.").
138. Id. at 16-17; see also Earl-Hubbard, supra note 1, at 835 ("An essential principle of due
process is that these deprivations [of life, liberty, or property] be preceded by notice and an
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
139. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 1, at 827 ("For most offenses an offender must have
knowledge of the facts that make his conduct illegal.").
140. See Jenkins & Dayton, supra note 132, at 17 ("[G]overnment officials cannot compel
confessions or otherwise misuse governmental power to deny fair procedures and trials. The
right of trial by jury is an additional protection against the improper use of governmental power."
(footnotes omitted)).
141. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 134, at 846 & nn.102-04. "Substantive due process
protects citizens from two primary types of government action. First, it protects citizens from any
government action that 'shocks the conscience.' Second, it prevents the government from
participating in conduct that interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id.
at 846 (footnotes omitted). Substantive due process also brings in some of the concepts found in
a cruel and unusual punishment analysis, such as the idea that punishments should be fair. See
Jenkins & Dayton, supra note 132, at 17 ("Even when convicted of violations of legitimate laws,
individuals are protected from excessive punishments. Substantive due process requires that
punishments must be fundamentally fair and proportional to the violation of law.").
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applies. 142 In doing so, courts must first determine if the government
action in question infringes upon a fundamental right of all people
protected by due process. 14 3 If the court finds that the action infringes
on such a right, the court then uses a strict scrutiny due process analysis
to decide whether the legislature was unjustified in infringing on the
right. 144 If the right is found to be a fundamental right that was unjustly
infringed upon by the legislature, the action is held to violate due
process. 145
If the right infringed upon is not a fundamental
constitutional right, courts, and specifically Illinois courts, will apply a
rational basis test. 14 6 The rational basis test is satisfied when the statute
bears a rational relationship to its legislative purpose.147 Thus, a statute
will be not be held unconstitutional if it reasonably relates to the public
interest intended to be served by the legislature and the legislature
48
adopts reasonable means to accomplish that objective.1
Opponents have challenged statutes such as the SORA, arguing that
149
the laws violate the due process rights found in the Constitution.
However, these challenges have not been successful, and courts have
50
held that such statutes do not violate due process. 1

142. Carter, supra note 134, at 846-47. Courts determine whether a fundamental right of all
or one class of persons is affected. Id. When the fundamental right is restricted for only one
classification of people, courts apply the equal protection rational basis test. Id.
143. Id. at 847. In order to infringe on a right of life, liberty, or property, the government
action must "substantially interfere" with that right. Id. at 848.
144. Id. at 847; see also In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (I11. 2001) ("To survive strict
scrutiny the means employed by the legislature must be 'necessary' to a 'compelling' state
interest ... and the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment
of its goal." The tests developed to determine if there was sufficient justification for the action
have been termed "means-end scrutiny" tests. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due
ProcessAnalysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 625, 627 (1992).
145. See Carter, supra note 134, at 847; see also Galloway, supra note 144, at 626-27
(describing the substantive due process analysis).
146. In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d at 1241; People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ill. 1991) ("[A]
rational basis test... prevents the implementation of a statute if it irrationally differentiates
between persons similarly situated." (citing Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Ill.
1984))); see also infra note 278 and accompanying text (noting the Illinois Supreme Court's
application of the test in J. W.).
147. In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d at 1241; People v. R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Il. 1989).
148. People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (111. 1991).
149. See Ball, supra note 96, at 414-15 & n.80 (giving an example of a case where
registration laws were challenged for violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). For an
example of a case that argued that the SORA violated due process guarantees, see Adams, 581
N.E.2d at 637, and see generally infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text for an examination of
the Adams decision.
150. See, e.g., Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 642 (holding that Illinois' registration statute did not
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally infra notes 176-85
and accompanying text (examining the Adams decision).
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D. The Treatment of Juveniles in the Court System

The Constitution is not the only limitation on the scope of registration
laws, as the treatment of juveniles in the court system also greatly
restricts their scope. 15 1 Over a century ago, the Illinois legislature
created the first juvenile court system in the United States by enacting
the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899,152 based on the belief that the
state should treat children differently than adults. 15 3 Unlike the adult

151. See Swearingen, supra note 82, at 549 (noting that the separate juvenile justice system
developed because children were not meant to be treated as criminals).
152. 1899 Ill. Laws 131; Susan A. Burns, Comment, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving Its
Purpose?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 335, 337 & n.ll (1996); see also Richardson, supra note 4, at 243
("Since its creation in Illinois in 1899, the [juvenile court] system has grown and is now found in
every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico."). The system was established "with two
main goals: to divert children from the harms of the punitive criminal justice system as much as
possible, and to intervene in the children's best interest when necessary." Garfinkle, supra note
9, at 194.
153. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1810; see also Richardson, supra note 4, at 243 ("The early
reformers wished to distinguish between the procedures and penalties applied to adults and those
applied to children."). Within this early system, juveniles were not given certain rights that adults
were given in the adult criminal system, such as the right to counsel, but juveniles have since
been afforded these rights through acts passed by state and federal legislatures. Alison G. Turoff,
Comment, Throwing Away the Key on Society's Youngest Sex Offenders, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1131 (2001). Illinois' Juvenile Court Act is an example of legislation
designed to protect the rights of juveniles. See generally 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5 (2002)

(affording specific rights to juveniles accused of committing a criminal offense); see also Turoff,
supra, at 1131 ("The Juvenile Court Act and both the Illinois and federal constitutions provide
minor defendants with many of the same protections that adult defendants have. For example,
juveniles have the right to counsel, the right to be free from self-incrimination, and the right to
face their accusers and question witnesses."). However, juveniles still are not given the right to a
jury trial, which has given rise to several claims that this omission violates procedural due
process. Turoff, supra, at 1131-32. On this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a
"trial by jury is not crucial to a system of juvenile justice." In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill.
1970).
To combat criticism over juveniles' restricted right to a jury trial, some states, including
Illinois, have passed legislation that gives juveniles the right to a jury trial. See Turoff, supra, at
1133 ("The Illinois Juvenile Court Act, for example, has three exceptions to the general rule of
bench trials for minor defendants. Juveniles have the right to a jury trial when they fall under the
provisions for (1) extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions, (2) habitual juvenile offenders, or
(3) violent juvenile offenders." (footnotes omitted)); see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5
(providing the right to a jury trial). Specifically, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act provides that "[a]
minor who is subject to an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution has the right to trial by
jury." Id. § 405/5-810(3). It also states that "[t]rial on ... petition [to seek adjudication as a
Habitual Juvenile Offender] shall be by jury unless the minor demands, in open court and with
advice of counsel, a trial by the court without jury." Id. § 405/5-815(d). Additionally, the Act
provides that "[tirial on the petition [to seek adjudication as a Violent Juvenile Offender] shall be
by jury unless the minor demands, in open court and with advice of counsel, a trial by the court
without a jury." Id. § 405/5-820(d). These jury trials usually are provided, however, only in
instances where the prosecution for the crimes committed would be more interested in protecting
society from criminals than in rehabilitating the juvenile offenders. See Turoff, supra, at 1134. It
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system, which is designed to punish offenders for their crimes, the
purpose of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate children who
commit crimes. 154 The legislators posited that if the state could
rehabilitate juvenile offenders, they would not commit crimes as
adults. 155 Moreover, the creators of the juvenile justice system believed
that children should be treated by the system with the care normally
found in a stable family environment. 156 In accordance with these
ideas, juveniles are adjudicated rather than convicted of a crime, and
adjudications focus more on treatment than on the offense
committed. 15 7 Additionally, dispositions are purposefully indeterminate
58
or nonproportional to help the juvenile's rehabilitative progress.1

In cases in which the juvenile commits an extremely serious crime,
he or she may not be eligible for the more lenient rehabilitative
treatment afforded by the juvenile court system and instead will be

must also be noted that the right to a jury trial afforded by the Juvenile Court Act is statutory, not
constitutional, and thus the legislature can eliminate it at any time. Id.
154. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1811 ("Whereas adult criminal systems were implemented to
punish misdeeds and discourage criminality, the juvenile justice system was intended to
rehabilitate youthful offenders and to protect the public."); see also Swearingen, supra note 82, at
549 ("[Tlhe function of the [juvenile] system was 'to investigate, diagnose, and prescribe
treatment, not to adjudicate guilt or fix blame."' (quoting SOL RUBIN, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (1986))).
155. Richardson, supra note 4, at 243 ("The system was designed to prevent children from
committing additional crimes by addressing and solving the underlying problems.").
156. Id. at 243-44 ("Even reprehensible acts committed by juveniles are not deemed the result
of a mature decision-making process; rather, they are seen as caused by environmental pressures
or other forces beyond the control of the child."). This concept is often referred to as parens
patriae. Bums, supra note 152, at 337; see also Swearingen, supra note 82, at 549 ("[Tlhe state
was to act as a parent, protecting instead of punishing the child.").
157. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1811; see also Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation
and DirectDemocracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281,
309 (2003) (noting that juveniles are adjudicated rather than convicted of a crime); Swearingen,
supra note 82, at 549 (noting that "rehabilitation became the central tenet of the juvenile justice
system"). To adjudge means "[t]o pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or
condemn;" to adjudicate means "[t]o settle in the exercise of judicial authority; [t]o determine
finally," whereas a conviction is "the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or
sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 63, 403 (4th ed.
1968).
158. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1812.
Unlike sentences based on statutory guidelines, as in the criminal system,
indeterminate dispositions in the juvenile system are limited only by the child's
amenability to treatment and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Indeterminate
juvenile court dispositions are also nonproportional because they are unrelated to the
nature of the child's particular offense.
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
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However, courts rarely impose adult

Yet, the possibility of such penalties is

important considering that, in recent years, the focus of the juvenile
court system has turned more to the offense committed, due in part to

the increase in serious and violent crimes committed by juveniles. 16 1
Nevertheless, noting the juvenile court system's emphasis on
rehabilitation and greater protection for child offenders, some
commentators consider the juvenile court system to be a real limitation
162
on the scope of sexual offender registration laws.
E. Statutory ConstructionRules Used by Illinois Courts in
Determining the Constitutionalityof a Statute
In Illinois cases in which the constitutionality of a statute is at issue,
courts must consider the legislative intent and the statutory construction
of the statute. 163 The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de

novo. 164

Courts presume that the statute is constitutional, and the

burden of demonstrating the statute's invalidity lies with the party
challenging the statute. 165 In construing a statute, Illinois courts are
bound to uphold its validity and constitutionality if reasonably
possible. 166 Accordingly, Illinois courts first examine the statute at
issue to determine legislative intent and then construe the statute in

159. Richardson, supra note 4, at 244 ("It has been recognized since the earliest days of the
juvenile justice system that the commission of a very serious crime would render a juvenile
ineligible for the juvenile courts' lenient and treatment-oriented dispositions.").
160. Id.
161. Swearingen, supra note 82, at 553 ("This shift in focus is the result of statistics that show
that juveniles are not only committing more crimes, but increasingly serious and violent
crimes.").
162. See Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1830 (noting that "the states that apply Megan's Law
statutes to juveniles do not do so according to the rehabilitative ideal"); Swearingen, supra note
82, at 555 ("If the Juvenile Code is premised primarily on the ideas of rehabilitation and
treatment of juvenile offenders, the application of Megan's Law to these offenders is not sound
policy. Megan's Law is not rehabilitative in any sense of the word.").
163. See, e.g., People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (I11.2000) (applying the statutory
construction rules in the context of an ex post facto challenge). These rules have also been used
in cases determining the constitutionality of the SORA. See, e.g., id. at 433 (determining the
constitutionality of the SORA); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Ill. 1991) (assessing
the constitutionality of the SORA); In re Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d 352, 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd
Dist. 2001) (assessing the constitutionality of the SORA's applicability to juvenile offenders); see
also infra Part 11.F (discussing Illinois case law interpreting the SORA).
164. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 437 (citing People v. Fisher, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (Ill. 1998)).
165. Id. (citing In re K.C., 714 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. 1999)).
166. Id. ("[Courts have] a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and
constitutionality if it can be reasonably done." (citing Fisher,705 N.E.2d at 71)).
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accordance with that intent. 167 The statutory language usually provides
the best indication of the drafters' intent; therefore, courts usually
1 68
should give it the plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning.
In construing the meaning of the words of a statute, the use of specific

words in one context and different words in another context
demonstrates that the legislature intended a different meaning for the
two words. 169 The courts have used these rules in cases involving sex
170
offender registration laws.
F. Constitutionalityof the SORA and the Applicability of Sex
Offender Registrationto Juvenile Sex Offenders
As noted above, Illinois was not the first state to enact sex offender
registration and notification laws, 17 1 nor is it the only state to have

confronted the issue of whether or not to include juvenile sex offenders
in those registration laws. 172 Moreover, like other states, the Illinois
courts have analyzed the constitutionality of its sex offender registration
law several times, with cases concerning both juvenile and adult
offenders. 173 When applying the SORA to juveniles, Illinois courts

have faced the question of whether they must require juvenile sex
offenders to register in order to remain consistent with the intent of the
legislature in drafting the statute, and whether it is constitutional to hold

167. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 354 ("[Courts must] ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent in enacting the statute." (citing Collins v. Bd. of Trs., 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253
(111.1993))).
168. Id. (citing Collins, 610 N.E.2d at 1253).
169. Id. ("[Wihere the legislature uses certain words in one context and different words in
another, it must intend a different meaning." (citing In re Marriage of Walters, 604 N.E.2d 432,
438 (I11.1992))).
170. See, for example, People v. Adams, in which the Illinois Supreme Court used the
statutory construction rules to interpret an earlier version of the SORA. People v. Adams, 581
N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill. 1991). See generally infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the Adams case).
171. See, e.g., State v. Misiorski, 738 A.2d 595, 603 (Conn. 1999) (holding that a community
could be notified of a sex offender's conviction as a condition of his probation).
172. See, e.g., Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Del. 2001) (holding that the application
of registration and notification statutes to a juvenile sex offender indicted as an adult was
constitutional); In re J.G., 777 A.2d 891,904 (N.J. 2001) (holding that juveniles can be required
to register, but such registration may cease at age eighteen if it can be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the juvenile is not a threat to the community); In re Ayres, 608 N.W.2d
132, 134 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that applying the registration statute to a juvenile sex
offender did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Michigan state
constitution).
173. See, e.g., People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 436 (I11. 2000) (assessing the
constitutionality of the SORA); In re Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d 352, 352 (I11.App. Ct. 2nd Dist.
2001) (assessing the constitutionality of applying the SORA to juvenile offenders).
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that the SORA can apply to juvenile sex offenders. 174 With each
constitutional challenge to the SORA, Illinois courts have used the
general statutory construction rules discussed above as well as the tests
175
relating to specific constitutional provisions.
One of the first and most referenced constitutional challenges to the

SORA took place in 1991, with the Illinois Supreme Court case People
v. Adams. 176 In Adams, the defendant, a convicted sex offender,
maintained that the Illinois Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration

Act (the "Registration Act"), the original predecessor to the SORA
effective at the time of the case, was unconstitutional because it
constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 177 The Illinois Supreme Court noted
that the state legislature passed the Registration Act in response to the
number of offenses committed against children and designed the law to
178
aid local law enforcement.
174. See Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 354 (determining whether the SORA applies to juvenile
sex offenders). In applying the registration requirement to juvenile sex offenders, the issues of
"reoffense" and "recidivism" arise. Richardson, supra note 4, at 248-49. Although both terms
measure the risk that a convicted juvenile sex offender poses to the community, reoffense refers
to "'new instances of sexually aggressive behavior, whether or not the new offense is similar to
prior sexual aggression,"' and recidivism refers to a new arrest, conviction, or incarceration of the
offender for any criminal or dangerous behavior. Richardson, supra note 4, at 248-49 (quoting
William C. Greer, Aftercare: Community Integration Following Institutional Treatment, in
JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, & CORRECTION 23 (Gail Ryan &
Sandy Lane eds., new and rev. ed. 1997)).
175. See Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 436 (assessing the constitutionality of the SORA); Nicholas
K., 761 N.E.2d at 353 (determining the constitutionality of applying the SORA to juvenile
offenders); supra Part II.E (discussing statutory construction rules used by Illinois courts).
176. People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637 (I11.1991).
177. Id. at 639-40, 642; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (stating that the
Habitual Child Sex Offender Act imposed a registration requirement on those convicted of at
least two sexual offenses against children). See generally supra note 97 and accompanying text
(discussing the Habitual Child Sex Offender Act as a precursor to the SORA). In Adams, the
defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault against his twelve-year-old daughter. Adams,
581 N.E.2d at 639. He was required to register pursuant to the Habitual Child Sex Offender
Registration Act. Id. The defendant in Adams also argued that the Habitual Child Sex Offender
Registration Act violated equal protection of the law afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was an underinclusive statute that did not include child pomographers. Id. at 642. The
court found this argument unpersuasive because the broad purpose of the statute was to prevent
sexual victimization of children, and although child pornographers could fit into this category,
their motives are often more profit-driven than sexually driven. Id. Therefore, the court held that
the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act did not violate the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution. Id.
178. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640. The court noted that "[tihe legislature passed the statute in
question in response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against children." Id. "The
Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies by requiring habitual child sex
offenders to register with the local law enforcement authorities whenever they move." Id. (citing
House Proceedings,84th I11.Gen. Assemb. 208 (1986)).
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To ascertain whether the Registration Act violated the Eighth
Amendment, the court first evaluated whether the registration
requirement constituted a punishment. 179 The court looked to the
legislative debates on the Registration Act and determined that the

purpose of the Act was not penal but rather another way to protect
children from sexual abuse. 180 The court noted that the legislature
needed to find a way to monitor such offenders to combat sex offenses
18 1
against children, and to educate children about possible attacks.
Further, the court noted that the Registration Act's lack of corrective

measures for the sex offender's behavior, such as counseling or a
treatment 82
program, provided further evidence that the statute was
nonpenal. 1
The court in Adams also found that the Registration Act did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 183 The
court noted that helping law enforcement officials protect children was
the public interest to be served by the Registration Act and that it was
reasonable to accomplish this purpose by providing the public with
information on known sex offenders. 184 Since the court found the
Registration Act did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and
did not violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Adams court held that the Registration Act was constitutional.185
179. Id. The court looked to whether or not the statute created a punishment in order to assess
the defendant's claim that the Registration Act constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. See generally supra Part II.C.1 (examining the
history of Eighth Amendment law).
180. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640 (citing House Proceedings, 84th Ill. Gen. Assemb. 208
(1986)). The sponsor of the bill, Representative Terry Parke, stated that the bill was "another tool
in protecting our children." House Proceedings, 84th Ill. Gen. Assemb. 208 (1986). The court
determined that "[sipecifically, the legislature sought to create an additional method of protection
for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse." Adams, 581
N.E.2d at 640.
181. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641. The court noted that "the most logical alternative available to
the legislature was to monitor the movements of the perpetrators by allowing ready access to
crucial information." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 642.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 644. The Illinois appellate courts followed the reasoning used in Adams in later
cases involving amended versions of the SORA. See, e.g., People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152, 160
(Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist. 1998) (holding that the registration and notification provisions of the
SORA and the Notification Law do not violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions); People v. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d 4, 7 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) (holding
that the SORA is constitutional because it protects a legitimate public interest and imposes a
collateral, rather than penal, consequence upon conviction); see also infra notes 186-201 and
accompanying text (discussing Logan and Starnes). See generally supra Part II.C (examining the
history of Eighth Amendment and due process law).
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In the 1995 case, People v. Starnes, the First District Appellate Court
of Illinois assessed whether the Illinois registration laws violated the ex
post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. 186 The
defendant in Starnes appealed his certification as a sex offender and the
requirement that he register as a sex offender pursuant to the Child Sex
Offender Registration Act ("Registration Act II"), a predecessor to the
SORA in effect at the time of the case, arguing that the registration
requirement violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions. 187 The court noted that the ex post facto clause of

the Illinois Constitution should be examined in the same
manner as the
188

ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.
The appellate court first stated that the Illinois Supreme Court had
held that the Registration Act, the predecessor to the Registration Act II,
18 9
was not penal and that its provisions did not constitute punishment.
186. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d at 6-7; see also infra notes 187-88 (explaining ex post facto laws).
187. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d at 5. The defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse against his fifteen-year-old niece. Id. He was sentenced to four years probation and
counseling, certified as a child sex offender, and required to give a blood sample to the state and
register as a sex offender. Id. at 5-6.
The United States Constitution provides, "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Illinois Constitution provides that "[n]o ex post facto law,
or law impairing the obligation of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges
or immunities, shall be passed." ILL. CONST., art. I, § 16. The Illinois Constitution has contained
a prohibition on ex post facto laws since its original version in 1818. See ILL. CONST. of 1818,
art. VIII, § 16. The Framers of the United States Constitution included a bar on such laws
because they considered ex post facto laws to be a violation of a fundamental right and grossly
unfair. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitution Bars Prosecution of Long-ago Child Abusers, TRIAL,

Jan. 2004, at 64. The prohibition on ex post facto laws in the original Constitution, before the
Bill of Rights, indicates the Framers' high disdain for such laws. Id. at 65.
188. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d at 6. In Calder v. Bull, the United States Supreme Court laid out
rules for what constitutes an ex post facto law. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1798).
The court stated:
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of
the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. If the law does not fall
into one of these categories, it does not constitute the type of ex post facto law the
Framers intended to prohibit.
Id.; see also Barger v. Peters, 645 N.E.2d 175, 176-77 (Ill. 1994) (holding that the Illinois
Constitution's ex post facto clause is to be construed the same way as the United States
Constitution's ex post facto clause).
189. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d at 6-7 (discussing People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (I11.
1991)). See generally supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Adams
decision).

2004]

The Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offenders in In re J.W.

975

The court then looked to other appellate court decisions that had held
that a registration requirement is not punishment.190 The court reasoned
that the current registration law contained the same provisions requiring
registration as the previous law, and therefore it too did not constitute a
punishment and did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the Illinois
19 1
and United States Constitutions.
More recently, in People v. Logan, the Second District Appellate
Court of Illinois assessed the constitutionality of the SORA. 1 9 2 The
defendant in Logan was convicted for failure to register as a sex
offender. 19 3 The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the
SORA was unconstitutional because it violated the ex post facto clauses
of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, violated due process, and
violated his right to privacy. 194 The appellate court first looked to
Illinois Supreme Court precedent that held the previous versions of the
SORA to be constitutional. 19 5 The court then looked to the amended
version of the SORA to assess its constitutionality under each of the
96
defendant's arguments. 1
In its assessment of whether the SORA violated the ex post facto
clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, the court looked
to the Illinois legislature's intent and found that the registration and
notification provisions in the SORA did not violate ex post facto
prohibitions in the constitutions. 197 The court then addressed whether

190. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d at 7. The court noted that an appellate court had held that
"certification is a collateral consequence of a defendant's conviction for a sex offense against a
child rather than a penalty or an enhancement of the sentence." Id. (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting People v. Murphy, 565 N.E.2d 1359, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991)). The court also
quoted from another appellate court decision that stated "[the Act is] an Act for the protection of
the general public from those prone to sex offenses against children. Any limitation of the rights
of an offender proscribed by the Act is made insignificant when weighed against the protection to
the public." Id. (quoting People v. Taylor, 561 N.E.2d 393, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990)).
191. Id.
192. People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1998).
193. Id. at 154. The defendant was required to register as a sex offender after his 1992 release
from prison following a 1990 conviction for a sex offense. Id.
194. Id. At the time of this case, the current version of the registration law, the SORA, was in
effect. See generally supra Part II.B (discussing the development of Illinois' registration law);
supra Part II.C.2 (examining the history of due process law).
195. Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 154-55.
196. Id. at 155-56.
197. Id. at 157-60. The court noted that "we... do not believe that the defendant has met his
burden of presenting by the 'clearest proof that the statutory scheme at issue is so punitive in
effect so as to negate the nonpunitive legislative intent." Id. at 160 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)); see supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing People v.
Starnes, in which the defendant contended that the registration statute constituted an ex post facto
law).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

the SORA violated due process, 19 8 finding that the defendant had not

satisfied his burden of showing that the SORA deprived him of a
protected liberty or property interest. 19 9 Lastly, the court evaluated
whether the statute violated the defendant's right to privacy and held
that the defendant's interest in information about where he resides is not
within the constitutionally protected "zone of privacy." 200 Therefore,
the court held that the SORA
was constitutional, affirming the
20 1

conviction of the lower court.
In 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of
both the SORA and the Notification Law in People v. Malchow.20 2 The
defendant in Malchow specifically argued that the SORA and the

Notification Law were unconstitutional because they were in violation
of the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, infringed on the right to privacy, subjected
him to double jeopardy, and violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to
20 3
violating the single-subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The court noted that the ex post facto clauses of the Illinois and
United States Constitutions did not render the SORA unconstitutional,
as the Adams decision had already determined that the registration
requirement did not constitute a punishment; therefore, the court
considered only the ex post facto argument as it applied to the
Notification Law. 204
After noting that the dissemination of a

198. Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 160-61. See generally supra Part II.C.2 (examining the history of
due process law).
199. Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 161. See generally supra Part II.C.2 (examining the history of due
process law).
200. Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 161. "[O]nly personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education are within the 'zone of privacy."'
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
201. Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 161-62.
202. People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 438 (I11.
2000). In Malchow, the defendant was
required to register as a sex offender after being convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in
1988, and in 1997 was brought to court for charges that he had never registered. Id. at 436. The
defendant was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and appealed his conviction, like
the defendant in Adams, maintaining that the SORA and the Notification Law were
unconstitutional. Id.
203. Id. at 436-37. See generally supra Part II.C (examining the history of Eighth
Amendment and due process law); supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing
People v. Starnes, in which the defendant contended that the registration statute constituted an ex
post facto law); infra note 212 (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause); infra note 215
(explaining the significance of the single-subject clause).
204. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 438. See generally supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the Adams decision); supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing People
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registrant's information is limited under the Notification Law, the court
found that the legislative intent behind the Notification Law was to
protect the public and not to punish sex offenders and child
murderers. 20 5 The court then determined that the Notification Law did
20 6
not have punitive effects in line with its nonpunitive intent.
Therefore, the court held that neither the SORA nor the Notification
Law violated the ex post facto clauses. 20 7 Moreover, the court
reiterated that they previously had rejected a cruel and unusual
punishment argument in Adams, and therefore the defendant's claim in
20 8
Malchow failed for similar reasons.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the SORA and the
Notification Law, holding that the statutes did not abridge the right to
privacy. 20 9 The court noted that the statutes did not require the offender
to provide information that fell within any area recognized as being part
2 10
of the right to privacy under the United States Constitution.
Additionally, the court determined that the defendant did not meet the
burden of demonstrating that the SORA and the Notification Law
2 11
violated the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The court also rejected the claim that the SORA and the Notification
Law constituted double jeopardy as it found both Acts to be
nonpunitive. 2 12 The court found that the defendant did not satisfy his
v. Starnes, where the defendant contended that the registration statute constituted an ex post facto
law).
205. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 438-39.
A simple reading of the act shows ... that the intent of the Notification Law is not to
stigmatize and shame sex offenders. Rather, the Act is carefully tailored so that the
information is disseminated in such a way as to protect the public.... The limited
dissemination of the information clearly demonstrates that the Notification Law is
intended to protect the public rather than to punish sex offenders.
Id.
206. Id. at 440; see supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the factors considered
by courts in determining punitive intent).
207. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 440.
208. Id. at 441. See generally supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text (examining the
Adams court analysis of cruel and unusual punishment under the Registration Act); supra Part
11.C. 1 (discussing the history of Eighth Amendment law).
209. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 442.
210. Id. at 441. The court noted that areas recognized under the United States Constitution
include "personal decisions involving marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education." Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 442. The Double Jeopardy Clause in the United States Constitution provides, "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Framers of the Constitution added the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect
citizens from multiple punishment. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)
(stating that "[i]n drafting his initial version of what came to be our Double Jeopardy Clause,
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burden of showing that the SORA and Notification Law violated due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution
because he did not present a reasoned or
2 13
developed argument.
Lastly, the court considered whether Public Act 89-8, which amended
the Registration Act 11,214 violated the single-subject clause of the
Illinois Constitution. 2 15 The court determined, again, that the defendant
had not satisfied the burden of proving that the provisions in 89-8 bore
no logical or natural relationship to the subject. 2 16 Consequently, the
James Madison focused explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment"); Kenneth G. Schuler,
Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91

MICH. L. REV. 2220, 2223 n.25 (1993) (noting that "[s]everal commentators have argued that the
Framers of the Constitution viewed the protection against multiple punishment as the preeminent
aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause"). To analyze a double jeopardy claim, courts determine
whether a sanction is criminal in nature, because the Framers designed the Double Jeopardy
Clause to protect against the imposition of "multiple criminal punishments for the same offense."
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997). If the sanction is found to be criminal,
courts then determine whether it is for an offense that has already been sanctioned-the Double
Jeopardy Clause provides that no person can be punished twice for the same offense, and no one
can attempt to punish a person criminally a second time for the same offense. Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995). The Illinois Constitution also contains a double jeopardy
clause, which provides that "no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence
against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." ILL. CONST., art. I, § 10.
213. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 442. The court stated:
Defendant next argues that the Registration Act and Notification Law violate the due
process and equal protection provisions of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
Defendant lumps both of these contentions into one seven-sentence argument. Three
of those sentences are merely quotes from the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
Defendant's "argument" amounts to little more than a suggestion. Glaringly absent is
any reasoned or developed argument.
Id. See generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the history of due process law).
214. See Act of Mar. 3, 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-8, 1995 Ill. Laws 322 (codified as amended at
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2); supra Part ll.B (discussing the history of the SORA).
215. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 442. The Illinois Constitution provides that "[b]ills, except bills
for appropriations and for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined
to one subject." ILL. CONST., art. IV, § 8(d). A bill's subject can be broad as long as the bill's
provisions are connected naturally and logically. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 442 (citing Johnson v.
Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (I11.
1997)). The single subject clause is violated "when [the
General Assembly] includes within one act provisions that by no fair interpretation have any
natural and logical connection to a single subject." Id. (citing Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 718
N.E.2d 191, 199 (Ill. 1999)). In determining if a law violates the single subject clause, Illinois
courts "construe the 'subject' liberally in favor of the legislature." Id. This clause originated in
the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Brannon P. Denning, Survey of Illinois Law: ConstitutionalLaw,

25 S.ILL. U. L.J. 733, 752 n.134 (2001).
216. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 443. The court noted that although Public Act 89-9 amended
several statutes, the court previously had held that legislation can amend several acts provided
that "the amendments related to the single subject of 'crime."' Id. (quoting People v. Wooters,
722 N.E.2d 1102, 1109-10 (Ill. 1999)). The logical and natural relationship test requires that the
various provisions within an enactment relate to a single subject but does not require that the
provisions be related to each other. People v. Morales, 795 N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st
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court held that the SORA and the Notification Law were constitutional

because

all

of the

defendant's

arguments

for the

statutes'

2 17
unconstitutionality were found to be without merit or support.
All of the above cases, however, dealt with the constitutionality of
Illinois' sex offender registration statute as it applied to adult
offenders. 2 18 The first Illinois case that dealt with the application of this
requirement to juvenile sex offenders was In re Nicholas K.2 19 In
Nicholas K, the defendant juvenile sex offender appealed his
registration requirement to the Second District Appellate Court of
Illinois, contending that the SORA did not require juveniles to register
as sex offenders. 220 The court in Nicholas K agreed with the defendant

Dist. 2003). For example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a public act that both amended the
Unified Code of Corrections to require payment or restitution after conviction in certain domestic
battery cases and amended the Illinois Vehicle Code to alter the conditions where an individual
convicted of driving while intoxicated could receive a temporary driving permit was not in
violation of the single-subject clause, as both amendments related to crime. People v. Wooters,
722 N.E.2d 1102, 1109-10 (I11.1999)).
217. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 443.
218. See supra notes 176-217 and accompanying text (discussing prior cases determining the
constitutionality of the SORA).
219. In re Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001). Other states also have
dealt with the question of applying a Megan's Law to juvenile sex offenders. See, e.g., Helman v.
State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Del. 2001) (holding that the application of Delaware's Sex Offender
Registration Statute to juveniles is a "proper exercise of legislative policy," does not infringe
upon a protected liberty interest under the Delaware or United States Constitutions, and is not
against the prohibition of ex post facto laws per the United States Constitution); In re Ayres, 608
N.W.2d 132, 134 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that requiring a juvenile sex offender to register
under Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act does not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); In re J.G., 777 A.2d 891, 910-12 (N.J. 2001)
(holding that under New Jersey's Registration and Community Notification Law, juvenile sex
offenders under the age of fourteen should not be required to register as sex offenders for the rest
of their life, and the sex offender registration requirement cannot apply for juvenile sex offenders
after the age of eighteen when clear and convincing evidence is presented that the juvenile sex
offender is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others). J.G. is one of the most prominent
and oft-discussed of such cases. See, e.g., Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 187-90 (examining the J.G.
case). In J.G., a juvenile sex offender who was ten years old at the time of his offense pled guilty
to "conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of second degree sexual
assault." In re J.G., 777 A.2d at 894. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
consistent with the purpose underlying N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47(a), that with respect to
juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sexual offenses committed when they were under
age fourteen Megan's Law registration and community notification orders shall
terminate at age eighteen if the Law Division, after a hearing held on motion of the
adjudicated delinquent, determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that
the delinquent is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.
Id. at 912.
220. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 353. In Nicholas K., the defendant, a thirteen-year-old boy,
stipulated to a charge that he committed criminal sexual abuse against a seven-year-old girl when
he was ten, and he was placed on court supervision, which did not constitute an adjudication of
delinquency and did not, therefore, subject him to the SORA's registration requirement. Id.
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and held that juvenile sex offenders could not be required to register
under the language of the SORA. 2 2' The court construed the SORA's

inclusion of a separate category denoting "juvenile sex offenders" to
mean that the legislature wanted these offenders to be treated
22 3
differently. 22 2 The court noted that because section 3 of the SORA
only required "sex offenders" to register and did not expressly mention

"juvenile sex offenders," juveniles were not bound by the registration

requirement. 2 24 The court reasoned that had the legislature wanted to

require juvenile sex offenders to register, they would have amended the
definition of sex offender to include them. 22 5 The court rejected the
State's argument that because section 2(A-5) of the SORA stated that
for the purposes of the section, "convicted shall have the same meaning
as adjudicated,- 226 the general class of sex offenders included juvenile
sex offenders. 22 7 Further, the court held that imposing a registration
requirement on a juvenile sex offender would be inconsistent with the
Juvenile Court Act (the "JCA"),2 28 which the legislature intended to
promote the best interest of the minor and maintain his or her
confidentiality. 2 29 The court noted that since the intention of the
legislature was not clear, it could not conclude that the legislature meant
to allow the release of a juvenile's information that is protected under
However, the court supervision was revoked when he missed several court services meetings, and
the defendant was then adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation. Id. at 353-54. He then
was ordered to register as a sex offender pursuant to the SORA. Id. at 354.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 355. See generally supra Part II.B (tracing the development of the SORA); supra
Part II.E (discussing statutory construction rules used by Illinois courts).
223. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3 (2002); see supra note 106 (quoting this section of the
SORA).
224. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 355; see supra Part .E (discussing statutory construction
rules used by Illinois courts).
225. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 355. The court reasoned that
[i]f the legislature wanted to provide that juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent
for having committed sex crimes had to register as sex offenders on the same basis as
adults convicted of sex crimes, it could simply have amended the definition of "sex
offender" to include juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent.
Id. See generally supra Part II.E (discussing statutory construction rules used by Illinois courts).
226. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A-5) (1998), amended by 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
150/2(A)(5) (2002); see supra note 103 (quoting this section of the SORA).
227. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 355.
228. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1-405/7-1 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
229. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 355. The court noted that "the legislature and the courts have
taken great pains to preserve the confidentiality of minors involved in juvenile court
proceedings." Id.; see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-8 (providing in part that "[i]nspection and
copying of juvenile court records relating to a minor who is the subject of a proceeding under this
Act shall be restricted"); supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court
system).
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the JCA. 230 Therefore, the court held that juvenile sex offenders were
not subject to the registration and notification requirements of the
uninformed about the possibility of offenders
SORA, leaving neighbors
23 1
living next door.

I1. DISCUSSION
in
Following the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois' holding 232
Nicholas K. that the SORA did not apply to juvenile sex offenders,
the Illinois Supreme Court faced the same issue in In re J. W., a case
involving a twelve-year-old sex offender. 23 3 Yet, the majority came to
the opposite conclusion of the court in Nicholas K. and held that
juvenile sex offenders are subject to the lifetime registration
requirement. 23 4 This Part first states the relevant facts of the J. W.
case. 2 35 Next, this Part discusses the Illinois Appellate Court decision
237
in In re J.W.236 Finally, this Part discusses the majority opinion,
Chief Justice McMorrow's concurring opinion, 23 8 and Justice Kilbride's
dissenting opinion 239 in the Illinois Supreme Court case In re J.W
A.

The Facts

In early November 1999, David Berg, an investigator with the Child
Advocacy Center of the Kane County State's Attorney's office,
questioned a twelve-year-old boy, J.W., who lived in the Village of
South Elgin, Illinois, to determine if the boy had sexually molested
another South Elgin child. 240 The family of R.We., a seven-year-old
boy, had filed a police report alleging that J.W. had forced sexual
contact with R.We. 24 1 During the investigation, Berg spoke with
R.We., R.We.'s family, and another alleged victim, J.P., who was also

230. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 356. "In the absence of a clearer expression of its intention,
we will not assume that the legislature intended to authorize the release of information about the
minor and his offense pursuant to the Act when the same information may not be released under
the Juvenile Court Act." Id. See generally supra Part II.E (discussing statutory construction rules
used by Illinois courts).
231. Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d at 354.
232. Id.
233. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 750 (I11.2003).
234. Id. at 756.
235. See infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of In re J. W.).
236. See infra Part HI.B (discussing the appellate court decision).
237. See infra Part III.C. I (examining Justice Thomas's majority opinion).
238. See infra Part II.C.2 (examining Chief Justice McMorrow's concurring opinion).
239. See infra Part II.C.3 (examining Justice Kilbride's dissenting opinion).
240. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 751-52.
241. Id.
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seven-years-old. 242 Both victims described explicit sexual acts that had
occurred with J.W. 24 3 Moreover, both stated that they had not told
anyone about the incidents because J.W. had instructed them not to tell,
and they feared retribution from J.W. if they told. 244 During the
investigation, Berg learned that an additional five-year-old boy had
witnessed J.W. exposing himself and R.We.'s six-year-old sister had
245
witnessed a sexual act between J.W. and R.We.
On November 10, 1999, the State filed a petition to adjudicate J.W. in
the Circuit Court of Kane County, alleging that he had committed
aggravated criminal sexual assaults against the two seven-year-old
boys. 246 J.W. pled guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal assault
on February 14, 2000, in exchange for the State withdrawing two other
counts of criminal sexual assault. 247 At the sentencing hearing in
February 2000, the trial court noted that it could not commit J.W. to the
juvenile division of the Department of Corrections because he was
under age thirteen, and even though the State had recommended
residential treatment for J.W., it had not determined whether there was a
treatment center that was able or willing to care for J.W. 24 8 The trial
court placed J.W. on five years of probation and ordered that he be
249 If
placed in residential treatment if such treatment was available.
such treatment was not available, the court prohibited J.W. from
returning to South Elgin and ordered him to live with his aunt in Elgin
until his parents moved from South Elgin. 250 Further, the court required
25 1
J.W. to register as a sex offender pursuant to the SORA.

242. Id. at 752.
243. Id. at 751-52.
244. Id. The fact that law enforcement investigated this type of situation demonstrates the
current attitude toward child sexual abuse by other children-that of outrage and shock over such
a horrific crime-whereas in the past, this type of behavior might have been seen as merely
exploratory. See Bremer, supra note 1, at 1346 ("In the late 1970s, adolescent sexual crimes were
often dismissed as 'boys will be boys' crimes. As public awareness grew in concert with data
collected from imprisoned adult sexual offenders, the serious nature of youth sexual offenses
grew clearer.").
245. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 752.
246. Id. at 751.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 751, 753. See generally supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in
the court system).
249. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 753. Courts tend to use treatment as a means to prevent further
offenses. See Lee, supra note 4, at 480 ("Relapse prevention is the primary focus to enable

juvenile offenders to manage their criminal tendencies.").
250. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 753.
251. Id.
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B. The Illinois Appellate Court Decision
J.W. appealed his probation to the Second District Appellate Court of
Illinois, 252 specifically appealing the conditions of his probation that (1)
required him to register as a sex offender and (2) ordered him not to
return to or reside in South Elgin. 253 On appeal, the appellate court
ruled that J.W. constituted a sexual predator under the SORA and that
he therefore was required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his
natural life.2 54 The appellate court based its ruling on its construction of
the SORA, specifically the sexual predator clause. 2 55 The appellate
court also held that the trial court's prohibition on J.W. from entering
South Elgin did not constitute an abuse of discretion because J.W.'s
parents had agreed to the restriction. 2 56 Consequently, J.W. then
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, again challenging the probation
requirements that banished him from the Village of South Elgin and
257
required him to register as a sex offender.
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
On February 21, 2003, in the five-to-one decision of In re J. W.,258 the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second District
Appellate Court of Illinois that J.W. was to be considered a sex offender
and subject to the lifetime registration requirement under the SORA,
vacated the Second District's decision prohibiting J.W. from returning
to South Elgin for any reason whatsoever, and remanded the case so that
the appellate court could consider whether the ban from South Elgin

252. This section of the Note will examine only the appellate court decision as it was
discussed by the Illinois Supreme Court, as the appellate court decision is not published per Rule
23 of the Illinois Supreme Court and is not available from the appellate court. For the provisions
of this rule, see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (2003).
253. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 753. J.W. argued that imposing a lifetime registration requirement
on a twelve-year-old violated due process. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. Although the appellate and supreme courts considered the trial court's geographic
restriction on J.W., this Note addresses only the portion of the Illinois Supreme Court opinion
assessing the SORA's applicability to juvenile sex offenders.
257. Id.
258. Justice Thomas was joined by Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, and joined in part
by Justice Kilbride. Id. at 750. Justice Rarick took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Id. at 766. Chief Justice McMorrow wrote a specially concurring opinion. Id. (McMorrow,
C.J., specially concurring). Chief Justice McMorrow was joined by Justice Freeman. Id.
(McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). Justice Kilbride delivered an opinion in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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was still necessary. 259 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
concluded that J.W. was a sexual predator under the SORA, and
therefore was subject to the lifetime reporting requirement. 2 60 Chief
Justice McMorrow concurred, noting that although the court correctly
applied the SORA to juvenile sex offenders, a lifetime reporting

requirement for juveniles was extremely harsh, and recommended that
the legislature consider rewording the statute. 26 1 Justice Kilbride filed

an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 262 Justice Kilbride

stated that although the court properly held that J.W. must be considered
of the
a sex offender under the SORA, the majority's 26interpretation
3
sexual predator clause of the SORA was incorrect.
1. Justice Thomas' Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas examined whether the
lifetime registration requirement imposed by the SORA could apply to

juvenile sex offenders in order to ascertain the validity of the lifetime
reporting requirement imposed on J.W. 264 The court began by
to
addressing J.W.'s claim that the trial court's order requiring him 265

register as a sex offender for the rest of his life was unconstitutional.

The court noted that because the trial court did not specify the duration

259. Id. at 765. The court noted that on remand, the appellate court should consider whether
"the geographic travel restriction is still warranted and, if so, what appropriate terms for entering
the geographic area should be applied." Id.
260. See infra Part III.C. 1 (discussing Justice Thomas' majority opinion).
261. See J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring); see also infra Part
III.C.2 (discussing McMorrow's concurring opinion).
262. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Kilbride's opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
264. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 754-56. The court first determined that the Illinois Supreme Court
had jurisdiction over the case. Id.
265. Id. at 754. The majority looked to People v. Wright and People v. Malchow as precedent,
noting that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proof, as
statutes are presumed constitutional, and that the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de
novo. Id.; see People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 766 (il. 2000); People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d
433, 437 (Ill. 2000). The majority further noted that in assessing whether a statute violates due
process, courts first must determine the right allegedly infringed upon by the statute, and if this
right is not a fundamental constitutional right, apply the rational basis test. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at
757 (citing In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (il. 2001); Wright, 740 N.E.2d at 767). The
rational basis test is satisfied when the statute bears a rational relationship to the legislative
purpose behind it. Id. (citing People v. R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (i1. 1989)). Thus, "a statute
will be upheld if it 'bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means
adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective."' Id. (quoting People v.
Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ill. 1991)). See generally supra notes 146-48 and accompanying
text (discussing the rational basis test); supra Part II.F (discussing constitutional challenges to
Illinois registration statutes).
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of time for which J.W. was to register and the appellate court deemed
J.W. a sexual predator and thus subject to the lifetime reporting
requirement under the SORA, the court must look to the construction of
the SORA itself.26 6 To construe the SORA, the court noted that it must
ascertain and consider the intent of the legislature. 267 Therefore, the

majority examined the definitions of "sexual predator" and "juvenile
sex offender" set forth in the SORA.2 68
In its construction of the SORA, the court looked specifically to
sections 2(A-5) and 2(E) and declared that J.W. clearly qualified as a
sexual predator when it read these two sections together. 269 The court
noted that because the statute stated that "convicted" has the same

meaning as "adjudicated" for purposes of section 2, and the SORA
defines a sexual predator as a person "convicted" of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, it follows that the defendant J.W., who was
"adjudicated" of aggravated criminal assault, is also a sexual predator
under the statute.2 70 Further, the court held that the lifetime registration
266. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 754-55.
267. Id. at 755. The court noted that "[i]n construing a statute, th[e] court must ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting that statute." Id. (citing Collins v. Bd. of Trs. of
the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ill. 1993)). To determine the
legislative intent, the court must "first examine the language of the statute, which is the most
reliable indicator of the legislature's intent." Id. (citing In re C.W., 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (Ill.
2002)) If the language of the statute "is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the
statute as written without reading into the statute exceptions, limitations or conditions that the
legislature did not express." Id. Further, a statute is "read as a whole, and no word or paragraph
should be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless." Id.; see also supra notes 163-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the Illinois statutory construction laws).
268. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 755. See generally supra notes 103, 107 and accompanying text
(explaining the SORA's definitions of sexual predator and juvenile sex offender); Ted Shaw &
Jamie R. Funderburk, Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders as Therapeutic Jurisprudence-A
Rational Approach to Community Protection, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY,
EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 5-3 (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen eds., 1999) ("Sexual predators
are individuals who have distorted beliefs about the rights of others, about consent, sexuality,
honesty, anger, power, or violence. They may be diagnosed with a variety of personality
disorders."). At the time of the J.W. case, 2149 of the adults on the Illinois sex offender registry
were classified as "sexual predators." Jeff Long, Sex PredatorLabel Can Be Put on Kids for Life,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2003, at IN, availableat 2003 WL 14857198.
269. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 755. See generally supra Part II.E (discussing statutory construction
rules used by Illinois courts); supra notes 103, 107 and accompanying text (discussing and
quoting sections 2(A-5) and 2(E) of the SORA). The court also noted the recent amendment to
the SORA deleting the section 2(A-5) separate definition of a juvenile sex offender and adding
section 2(A)(5), which specifically provides that a sex offender is "any person who is
'adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of committing or attempting to commit' certain
specified acts, including aggravated criminal assault." JW., 787 N.E.2d at 755, n.1 (quoting 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(5)). See generally supra note 105 (quoting section 2(A)(5)).
270. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756. See generally supra notes 103, 107 and accompanying text
(discussing and quoting sections 2(A-5) and 2(E)). Giving support to the majority's interpretation
of the SORA, Justice Thomas declared, "This statutory language is clear and unambiguous, so we
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requirement imposed by the appellate court was also in line with the
proper construction of the SORA.2 7 1 The court reasoned that although a

juvenile sex offender generally would fall into the class of sex offenders
required to register for ten years after adjudication, those juvenile sex
offenders considered to be sexual predators must register for the rest of
their natural lives because the SORA imposes such a registration
requirement on sexual predators. 272
The court noted that the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois in
Nicholas K. incorrectly applied the SORA to juvenile sex offenders by
holding that because section 3 of the SORA does not refer specifically

to juvenile sex offenders, juvenile sex offenders are not required to
register.273 The court noted that although the SORA does not mention
juvenile sex offenders explicitly, the SORA does mention sex offenders
and sexual predators in section 3.274 The court further stated that
juvenile sex offenders do indeed constitute "sex offenders" as defined
by the SORA, though they make up a specific category of such
offenders and as such, are subject to the registration requirements
imposed in section 3.275 The court then examined the SORA in
conjunction with the Notification Law, stating that because the

Notification Law expressly mentions juvenile sex offenders, the
legislature must have intended the SORA to apply to juvenile sex
offenders, for if they were not subject to registration, there would be no
27 6
need for their mention in the Notification Law.

give effect to the statute as written." J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756. This indicates that the court was
attempting to follow the statutory construction rule laid out in C.W. See supra Part .E
(discussing the statutory construction rules used by Illinois courts).
271. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756.
272. Id.
273. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756. See generally supra Part II.E (discussing the statutory
construction rules used by Illinois courts); supra notes 219-31 and accompanying text (discussing
the Nicholas K. decision).
274. J.W, 787 N.E.2d at 756. See generally supra Part II.E (discussing the statutory
construction rules used by Illinois courts).
275. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756. The majority supported these assertions with statements made
by state representatives and senators during the debates concerning House Bill 2721, which
amended the SORA to add the separate definition of a juvenile sex offender. Id. See generally
supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing this amendment). The majority specifically
mentioned Representative Klinger's statement "that the bill requires juveniles who are
adjudicated delinquent to register" and Senator Klemm's statement that the addition of the
separate definition for "juvenile sex offenders imposes registration requirements of those
persons." J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 756-57 (internal quotations omitted) (citing House Proceedings,
91st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 143 (1999); Senate Proceedings,91st Ill. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
52 (1999)).
276. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757; see 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/105 (2002) (providing the
definition of juvenile sex offender). See generally supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text
(discussing and quoting from the Notification Law).
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After determining that the SORA was applicable to juvenile sex
offenders, the court assessed whether the SORA violated the substantive
due process afforded to J.W. by the United States Constitution. 277 The
court applied the rational basis test 278 and noted that in earlier cases
dealing with previous versions of the SORA, such as Adams, the court
had found that the registration requirement was not an unreasonable
way of serving the statute's purpose of protecting minors from sexual
abuse; thus the statute did not violate substantive due process. 279 The
court stated that the public interest served by the statute did not change
because of the age of the offender. 280 Indeed, the court rejected J.W.'s
argument that a lifetime registration requirement imposed on a twelveyear-old is an unreasonable means of achieving the legislature's
objective because it does not support the intent of the JCA. 28 1 The
court concluded that the lifetime registration requirement for J.W. was
consistent with the JCA, as subsequent amendments to the JCA marked
a shift in its purpose from rehabilitation to protection of the public; thus,
the court held that the lifetime registration requirement's application to
28 2
juvenile sexual predators supported the purpose of the JCA.

277. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757. See generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing due process law);
supra Part II.E (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court standards for determining the
constitutionality of a statute).
278. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757; see supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (explaining the
rational basis test for determining the constitutionality of a statute).
279. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757-58. See generally supra Part H.C.2 (discussing due process
law). The majority looked to the precedent case of People v. Adams, which dealt with an earlier
version of the SORA. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 757. The majority noted that in Adams, the Illinois
Supreme Court found that the earlier SORA was enacted "'in response to concern over the
proliferation of sex offenses against children and was designed to aid law enforcement agencies
by requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement authorities." Id. (quoting People
v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill. 1991)). The legislature's intent was "'to create an additional
method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual
abuse."' Id. at 757 (quoting Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 637). See generally supra notes 176-85 and
accompanying text (discussing the Adams case).
280. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 758. The court observed that "[i]n the context of a 12-year-old sex
offender, the public interest to be served by the Registration Act remains unchanged." ld. See
generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing due process law and its possible limitations on sex
offender registration statutes).
281. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 758. The JCA's general purpose is to "secure for each minor subject
[to the Act] such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will serve the safety
and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the
community." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (2002). The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District in In re Nicholas K. found that imposing the sex offender registration requirement on
juvenile sex offenders was inconsistent with the JCA, which the court stated was enacted to
correct minors' behavior, not to punish. In re Nicholas K., 761 N.E.2d 352, 355 (II1. 2001).
282. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 759 (citing In re A.G., 746 N.E.2d 732, 735 (I11. 2001)). See
generally supra Part I.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
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The court further held that the Notification Law is also a reasonable
means of achieving the legislature's goal of protecting the public
because the Notification Law does not provide information about the

juvenile sex offender to others unless it can be proved that the sex
offender has placed such persons in danger. 283 In holding so, the court
noted that the rational basis test for determining the constitutionality of
a statute does not mandate that the statute be the best means of
advancing the legislature's objectives. 284
The court additionally
explained that the Notification Law's strict access requirement for the

juvenile offender's information made it reasonable to apply the lifetime
registration requirement to juvenile sex offenders. 285 Therefore, the
court rejected J.W.'s claims that the SORA violated his substantive due
process rights. 2 86 The court noted, though, that it was not ruling
whether the SORA was the best means to achieve the objective of
protecting the public interest, recognizing legislative domain over the
2 87
issue.
The court also rejected J.W.'s claim that the registration requirement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 288 The court noted that J.W.
conceded that in People v. Malchow, the Illinois Supreme Court had
held that the SORA and the Notification Law did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, but J.W. argued that his case could be distinguished from
Malchow because the defendant in Malchow was an adult and the
version of the Notification Law at issue in Malchow provided for more
limited dissemination of registered offenders' information than did the

283. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 760. The court quoted the language of the statute in the opinion,
emphasizing that information is only given to a person after a juvenile sex offender compromises
the safety of that person. Id. at 760 & n.3.
284. Id. (citing People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 703 N.E.2d 1, 4 (111. 1998)).
285. Id. The majority later noted that this restriction on juvenile sex offender information
invalidated J.W.'s argument that the Notification Law as applied to juveniles was against the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 761-62.
286. Id. See generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing due process law and its possible
limitations on sex offender registration statutes).
287. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 760 ("Whether there are better means to achieve this result, such as
limiting the duration of registration for all juvenile sex offenders including juvenile sexual
predators, is a matter better left to the legislature."). New Jersey is an example of a state that has
lessened the duration of time by which juvenile sex offenders have to register. See, e.g., In re
J.G., 777 A.2d 891, 912 (holding that juvenile offenders under age fourteen may be relieved of
the registration requirement upon clear and convincing evidence that they do not pose a threat to
the safety of others); see also supra note 219 (discussing the J.G. case and the approach of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in applying the registration requirement to juvenile offenders).
288. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 762. See generally supra Part II.C.1 (discussing cruel and unusual
punishment).
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The court again noted the limited

dissemination of information on juvenile offenders provided by the
Notification Law, rejecting J.W.'s argument that the Notification Law
constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it allowed for
unlimited dissemination of his personal information. 290 The court also
held that J.W.'s argument that the Notification Law constituted cruel
and unusual punishment because it was analogous
to the death penalty
29 1
for an adult was not supported by precedent.
Thus, because the court held that the SORA did not violate
substantive due process and did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the appellate
court that J.W. constituted a sex offender and was subject to the
SORA's lifetime registration requirement but remanded the case so that
the lower court could determine whether J.W.'s ban from South Elgin
292
was still necessary.
2. Chief Justice McMorrow's Specially Concurring Opinion
In a specially concurring opinion, Chief Justice McMorrow stated
that, while she agreed with the majority that the SORA's lifetime
registration requirement applied to juvenile sex offenders who are
deemed sexual predators, she cautioned against the severity of such a
requirement. 293 Although she agreed with the court's interpretation of
the SORA and its ruling on the SORA's constitutionality, Chief Justice

289. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 761. The court noted that it had already performed an Eighth
Amendment analysis of Illinois' registration and notification statutes and found that neither
statute constituted punishment. Id. at 762. See generally supra notes 202-17 and accompanying
text (discussing the Malchow decision).
290. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 762. The court based this determination mainly on the fact that
"[t]he Notification Law specifically addresses juvenile sex offenders and provides that
information concerning juvenile sex offenders is not available on the Internet and public access to
information concerning juvenile sex offenders is limited to those whose safety might be
compromised for some reason related to the juvenile sex offender." Id. at 761. Further, the court
noted that Malchow was not distinguishable from J.W.'s case because the dissemination of
juvenile offender information is even more restricted than the dissemination of the information at
issue in Malchow. Id. at 762.
291. Id. The majority noted that the restriction on juvenile sex offender information
contradicted this theory and found no merit in the argument analogizing the registration
requirement to the death penalty, as the court had previously held that the provisions of the
SORA and Notification Law did not constitute punishment. Id. (citing People v. Malchow, 739
N.E.2d 433, 440 (I11.2000)).
292. Id. at 765. See generally supra Part II.C.I (discussing cruel and unusual punishment);
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing due process).
293. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring).
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McMorrow argued that a conflict existed between the lifetime reporting
294
requirement and the ideals of the juvenile justice system.
Chief Justice McMorrow cited provisions of the JCA that do not

allow the State to prosecute a minor younger than thirteen under the
criminal laws of the state or to subject a minor to an extended juvenile
prosecution. 295 She contended that these provisions demonstrate a
legislative intent that minors under thirteen should not be tried as
adults. 29 6 She noted that because children under thirteen years of age
have less capacity to form criminal intent, the SORA should make a
29 7
distinction in its treatment of juveniles under the age of thirteen.
Chief Justice McMorrow pointed out that all fifty states have adopted
sex offender registration and community notification laws, but the
treatment of juvenile sex offenders under these laws differs from state to
state. 298 She recommended that the Illinois legislature reevaluate the

imposition of such a harsh punishment on juveniles, particularly those
under the age of thirteen. 299 She argued that having a policy in place

294. Id. (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring); see also supra notes 277-92 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's constitutional analysis of the SORA). See
generally supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
295. J.W, 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring); see also 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (providing that "[tihe definition of delinquent
minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an
offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with... aggravated criminal sexual
assault"); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (2002) (providing that a minor under thirteen cannot
be subject to extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions).
296. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring).
Chief Justice
McMorrow noted that "these provisions reflect a legislative understanding that children under the
age of 13, no matter how serious the offense charged, 'simply are too immature as a matter of law
to be tried as an adult."' Id. (citing In re J.G., 777 A.2d 891, 904 (N.J. 2001)). See generally
supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
297. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). See generally supra
Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
298. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring).
Chief Justice
McMorrow noted that some states, such as Florida and Delaware, do not expressly include
juveniles in their registration and notification statutes:
In some instances, although registration requirements are made applicable to juveniles,
the burden has been ameliorated by various means: by making a jury trial a condition
precedent to juvenile registration, allowing the juvenile court the discretion to waive
the registration requirement, providing that the duty to register will terminate at a
certain age or by allowing the juvenile to petition for termination of the registration
duty upon a clear showing that the juvenile has not reoffended and that registration is
no longer necessary to protect the public.
Id. (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). See generally supra notes 75-95 and accompanying
text (discussing the registration statutes of other states).
299. J.W, 787 N.E.2d at 767 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). The Chief Justice
stated, "[W]hile I am compelled to agree with th[e] determination [that the Registration Act and
lifetime reporting act can apply to minors], I, nevertheless, invite the legislature to reconsider the
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that allows a twelve-year-old offender to be subject to the lifetime
reporting requirement may be unduly burdensome. 30 0 In addition, the
Chief Justice noted that the legislature could merge the public safety
concerns with traditional notions of the necessity of protecting and
wisdom of imposing such a burden on juveniles, particularly juveniles under the age of 13." Id.
(McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). See generally supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment
of juveniles in the court system).
300. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). For example, scholars
have noted that there is the possibility that the registered juvenile offender may be subject to
vigilantism. See Hiller, supra note 77, at 286 ("Reported incidents of violence against sex
offenders has been widespread in areas that allow the public access to registration information.");
Mark Brown, Net Names Pedophiles; County Sheriff Lists Child Molesters, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1998, at I (discussing Illinois' posting of the sex offender registry on the Internet and
the possibility of vigilantism against the offenders, as "sex offender registries have contributed to
acts of vigilantism elsewhere in the country, 'even against people whose names and addresses
were on the list by mistake"'), availableat 1998 WL 5593581. Some sex offenders have become
literally homeless due to community reaction after notification of their past conduct. See Bayles,
supra note 64.
In some states, vigilance has turned into vigilantism.
Raul Meza was released from a Texas prison... after serving II years for an 8year-old girl's murder, but citizen protests drove him out of six towns. He finally
moved in with his mother in Austin.
In Washington state, where local police call news conferences to announce the
arrival of sex felons, residents of Lynnwood torched the home of child rapist Joseph
Gallardo. He fled to a brother's home in Deming, N.M., but was forced to leave after
protests there. He returned to Washington.
Id. In an example of a juvenile sex offender subject to such vigilantism,
Alan Groome, a juvenile sex offender who spent three years in a Washington prison for
raping two boys, moved into an Olympia, Washington, apartment with his mother.
The local police department knocked on seven hundred doors in the neighborhood,
handing out fliers containing Groome's photo and address. The landlord eventually
evicted Groome and his mother, and after eviction, they moved into his grandmother's
apartment. Local officials then notified the new neighbors of Groome's conviction.
The grandmother's landlord pressured Groome and his mother into leaving by
threatening to evict the grandmother. Groome is now sheltered at a facility for the
homeless in a different part of the state and he is consistently rejected for employment.
Hiller, supra note 77, at 287 (footnotes omitted). Those offenders left homeless pose an even
bigger threat to the community, as more often than not they are not registered, Alex Rodriguez,
Homeless Lost in Sex-offender Registration, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at 3, available at
1996 WL 6764358. "No one knows how many homeless people are among the nearly 20,000
Illinoisans convicted of a sex offense in the last 10 years and therefore required to register....
[R]eaching homeless sex offenders is 'certainly difficult... since they move from shelter to
shelter and town to town." Id. Additionally, sometimes the wrong person becomes a victim of
such violence. Hiller, supra note 77, at 286. For example, "[a] father and son broke into the
house at [a] disclosed address, looking for the adult sex offender. Once inside they attacked a
man thought to be the rapist, but actually attacked the wrong man. The beating was so severe the
man had to be hospitalized." Id. (footnotes omitted). However, even with the possibility of
vigilantism, the beneficial effects of the law on the general public, especially potential victims,
must be weighed heavily. See Lee, supra note 4, at 512-13 ("Affected sex offenders may suffer
from potential acts of vigilantism. This concern, however, must be balanced with the rights of the
potential victims that Megan's Law is meant to protect." (footnotes omitted)).
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rehabilitating the youth of Illinois by rewording the SORA to prevent

courts from construing juveniles as sexual
predators and subjecting
30 1
them to the lifetime reporting requirement.
3. Justice Kilbride's Dissenting Opinion
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Kilbride disagreed with the majority's holding that the SORA required
J.W. to register as a sexual predator for the rest of his life and stated that

an interpretation requiring such registration by a twelve-year-old child

"offends principles of substantive due process." 30 2 Accordingly, he
30 3
argued that the majority improperly construed the statute.
Specifically, he contended that a juvenile sex offender cannot constitute
a sexual predator under the SORA.3 °4 Justice Kilbride explained that
although he did agree with the majority's holding that J.W. did
constitute a sex offender under the SORA, the majority's interpretation
of the sexual predator clause of the SORA was incorrect. 30 5 The
dissent, like the majority, looked at section 2(A-5) 306 in conjunction

301. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring). See generally supra
Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
302. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's holding that J.W. was a sexual
predator and subject to the lifetime registration requirement). See generally supra Part II.C.2
(discussing the history of due process law). Additionally, Justice Kilbride objected to the
"unnecessary factual description" of J.W.'s sexual conduct with the victims contained in the
majority opinion. J. W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
supra note 267 (discussing Illinois statutory construction precedent and noting that construction is
unnecessary when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous). The majority found the
language of the SORA to be clear and unambiguous. See supra note 270. However, Justice
Kilbride noted that "[a] statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation," and that the parties in the case disagreed as to the interpretation of the SORA's
application to juvenile sex offenders, acknowledging that the SORA is subject to differing
interpretations. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (I11.
1997)). Therefore, the SORA "is clearly subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation and is thus ambiguous," making the majority opinion
incorrect in Justice Kilbride's opinion. Id. (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
supported this statement by citing the Illinois State Police's A Guide to Sex Offender Registration
in Illinois and quoting a section that states that "[a]djudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders
are not predators" and "[a]djudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders cannot be classified as
sexual predators." Id. at 769 (Kilbride, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also ILL.
STATE POLICE, A GUIDE TO SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION IN ILLINOIS 6, 31, 33 (Oct. 1, 2002),
availableat http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/sorguide.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004).
305. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 270 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's interpretation of the sexual predator
clause of the SORA).
306. See supra note 103 (quoting section 2(A-5) of the SORA).
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with section 2(E) 30 7 but argued that reading these sections together
established that a juvenile sex offender cannot constitute a sexual
predator, because section 2(A-5), which defines a juvenile sex offender,
30 8
makes no reference to section 2(E), which defines a sexual predator.
Conversely, Justice Kilbride noted, section 2(E) makes no reference to
section 2(A-5) and does not indicate that a juvenile sex offender can be
classified as a sexual predator. 30 9 Further, he disputed the majority's
conclusion that convicted means the same as adjudicated for purposes
of section 2(E), pointing out that although the statute states that the two

have the same meaning for the purposes of section 2(A), there is no
such statement in section 2(E). 3 10 Justice Kilbride argued that the
legislature intended the term "sexual predator" to apply only to those
who have been "convicted" in an adult court for one of the specified
311
offenses, including aggravated criminal sexual assault.
Furthermore, he indicated that the State had noted in its brief that the
trial court required J.W. to register as a sex offender, not a sexual
predator, and that the appellate court mistakenly had held that J.W. must
register as a sexual predator. 3 12 Justice Kilbride concluded by arguing
that because the State did not try J.W. as an adult, the State should not
treat him as an adult by requiring him to comply with the lifetime
registration requirement that is imposed on adults. 3 13 He argued that
307. See supra note 107 (quoting section 2(E) of the SORA).
308. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id. (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 107 (quoting
section 2(E)).
310. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 270 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's determination that convicted means
adjudicated for the purposes of 2(E)).
311. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kilbride noted that any other interpretation of the SORA would lead to unjust results and gave an
example that using the majority's construction, under the SORA sections 2(A-5) and 2(E), any
juvenile sex offenders considered sexual predators would be subject to the lifetime registration
requirement, but a sex offender or sexual predator convicted of first degree murder has to be
seventeen years old before becoming subject to the lifetime registration requirement. Id.; see also
supra notes 103, 107 and accompanying text (quoting sections 2(A-5) and 2(E) of the SORA).
312. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 769 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text (discussing the trial court proceedings).
Justice Kilbride supported his theory that J.W. should not be considered a sexual predator and
subject to the lifetime registration requirement by quoting a passage from the State's brief that
indicates that public policy can be served by a lesser registration requirement: "As a sex offender,
the registration of the minor is limited to 10 years. A 10-year requirement ...strikes a fair
balance between Respondent's desire for a limited registration time and the People's concerns for
protecting the public." Id. (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 769-70 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kilbride noted that juveniles convicted as adults are afforded the determination of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and the protection of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
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there is no legitimate rationale or objective for subjecting a juvenile
under age thirteen to such requirement. 3 14 Therefore, Justice Kilbride
contended that J.W. could not constitute a sexual predator
and should
3 15
not be subjected to the lifetime reporting requirement.

IV. ANALYSIS
In In re J. W., the Illinois Supreme Court's most recent construction
of the SORA, a statute that the court previously had noted was designed
to protect children from sexual abuse, 3 16 the court appeared to hold that
the legislative intent is furthered even when the SORA applies to
juvenile offenders. 3 17 However, the court was divided as to whether the
3 18
statute should impose such harsh penalties on juvenile offenders.
This Part first demonstrates that the court properly analyzed and
construed the SORA, using the rules of statutory construction. 319 Then,
this Part argues that the legislature should not rewrite the SORA,
despite the possible harsh results to juveniles when courts apply
the
320
SORA' s lifetime registration requirement to juvenile offenders.
United States Constitution, while juveniles who are adjudicated of a criminal offense do not
receive the advantage of such protections. Id. at 769 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Further, he argued, as J.W. could not be tried as an adult, he should not be
treated as an adult by requiring him to register for the rest of his life. Id. at 770 (Kilbride, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
314. Id. (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kilbride argued that
the majority's interpretation does not comply with substantive due process, as imposing a lifetime
registration requirement on a twelve-year-old is not a reasonable manner of achieving the
legislature's objective. Id. (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally
supra notes 277-86 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's substantive due process
analysis); supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (discussing the application of substantive
due process law).
315. J.W, 787 N.E.2d at 767 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
316. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Adams court's
interpretation of the SORA).
317. See supra notes 266-76 and accompanying text (discussing the majority holding in J. W.
that juveniles can be subject to the requirements of the SORA in keeping with the legislative
intent of the statute).
318. See supra Part II.C.2-C.3 (discussing the concurrence and dissent in J.W. that noted the
harshness of a lifetime reporting requirement for juvenile offenders).
319. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing how the court's construction of the SORA in its
application to juvenile sex offenders was correct).
320. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that although the concurrence and dissent brought up a valid
point about the harshness of the SORA's effect on juvenile offenders, the legislature should not
reword the statute). Scholars have supported the idea that juvenile offenders must be monitored
in the same manner as adult offenders. See Jacqueline Jackson Kikuchi, When the Offender Is a
Child: Identifying and Responding to Juvenile Sexual Abuse Offenders, in CHILD SURVIVORS
AND PERPETUATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE: TREATMENT INNOVATIONS 116 (Mic Hunter ed., 1995)
("Judging by the number of juvenile offenders reported, we need to improve society's awareness
of and responses to juvenile sexual abuse offending.").
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A. The Court Correctly Construedthe SORA to Uphold the
Legislative Intent
The majority correctly applied the statutory construction rules and
construed the SORA as allowing juvenile sex offenders to constitute
sexual predators. 3 2 1 While a lifetime registration reporting requirement
for minors under the age of thirteen admittedly is harsh, this
requirement is still in line with the proper construction of the SORA
because it furthers the legislative intent. 3 22 The majority correctly noted
that in construing a statute, courts must ascertain the legislative intent
by examining the language of the statute. 323 Moreover, the court
properly utilized the Illinois rules of statutory construction to determine
the intent of the legislature, for courts must use those rules if the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. 324 Here, the court
was correct in determining that the language of the statute was clear and
unambiguous, and thus should be treated as written, because the statute
provides that a sexual predator includes a person convicted of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and that "convicted" has the same
meaning as "adjudicated" for purposes of the statute. 325 Further, the
court properly used the Illinois rules of statutory construction in this
case because relying on established rules helps achieve consistency in
the law. 326
Additionally, utilizing statutory construction adds
predictability to the law. 327 Accordingly, predictability in sex offender
registration laws will help ensure that the statutes fulfill their intended
purpose of protecting the public from harm, instead of allowing courts
to decide arbitrarily how to construe the statute, subjecting some
321. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority opinion in J.W.).
322. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing Chief Justice McMorrow's concurrence, which agreed
with the majority's construction of the SORA); supra Part II.E (discussing the statutory
construction rules used by Illinois courts).
323. See supra Part II.E (discussing the rules for statutory construction used by Illinois

courts).
324. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 756 (I11.2003); see supra Part II.E (discussing the rules of
statutory construction in Illinois).
325. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2 (2002); supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's statutory analysis of the SORA).
326. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 644

(2002) ("[T]he interpretive techniques of statutory construction may be motivated by a desire to
generate consistent interpretations of statutory text."); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-institutionalApproach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1047 n.43
(2003) (noting that statutory construction helps the court interpret language consistently); supra
Part tI.E (discussing the statutory construction rules used by Illinois courts).
327. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 326, at 639 (noting the importance of statutory
construction in assuring predictability); supra Part I.E (discussing the statutory construction rules
used by Illinois courts).
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offenders to328the requirement and releasing others from such a
requirement.
Through the use of statutory construction, the court in J.W. correctly
determined that the intent of the legislature was to protect the best
interests of the public. 329 One must remember the disturbing nature of
sexual abuse of children 330 and that preventing such abuse, no matter
who the offender, is the desired goal and the most important factor in
applying such registration rules. 331 Accordingly, the majority properly
held that J.W. must register for the rest of his life. 332 This decision was
especially sound in light of the disturbing nature of his crime and the
legislative intent to protect other minors from possible sexual attack. 333
Therefore, the court correctly ascertained the legislative intent and
properly upheld the constitutionality of the SORA.33 4

328. See Allison L. Almason, Comment, PersonalLiability Implications of the Duty To Warn
Are Hard Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond, 13 J. CONTEMP.

HEALTH L. & POL'Y 471, 482 (1997) (noting that statutory construction can achieve
predictability in therapist disclosure law, which may lead to stabilization of therapist insurance
rates).
329. J.W., 787 N.E.2d at 758; supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text (noting that the
court reasoned that the SORA was designed to protect the public).
330. See KINNEAR, supra note 1, at 1 ("Today, the problem of childhood sexual abuse is
foremost in the minds of many professionals as well as the general public. New charges are
levied almost daily, against parents, priest, day-care operators, or others to whom we entrust our
children.").
331. The registration requirement is important in the case of juvenile sex offenders, as these
types of offenses are not always reported, so identifying the abuser earlier rather than later will
help prevent attack. See Kikuchi, supra note 320, at 108-09.
[I] have become aware that we, as a society, are tolerant of sexual abuse between
children or adolescents, even when there is a considerable age difference between the
children or adolescents or when some of those involved clearly did not consent to the
activity.... I am... sure that some of the acceptance comes from the fact that we do
not want to believe that adolescents and children can be sexual abuse offenders.
Id.

332. See supra notes 266-85 and accompanying text (discussing the majority holding that the
SORA can apply to juvenile offenders and those offenders can constitute sexual predators who
are subject to the lifetime registration requirements).
333. See supra Part III.A (providing the facts of the J.W. case). Registration may help
identify a potential threat if such deviant behavior were to recur, as is highly possible with sex
offenses generally. See RENVOIZE, supra note 3, at xiii ("[I]ncarcerating for a brief period those
who are caught achieves nothing; sexual abuse will have been part of their lifestyle for many
years, perhaps from their own childhood, and within a short time of leaving jail they will almost
inevitably set about finding another victim.").
334. Supra Part III.C.1 (examining the majority decision in J.W.).
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B. The SORA Should Not Be Amended Despite the Potentially Harsh
Results When Enforcing the SORA Against Juvenile Offenders
The majority correctly held that the SORA can subject juvenile sex
offenders to the lifetime reporting requirement, but the concurring and
dissenting opinions both observed that imposing a lifetime reporting
3 35
requirement on a juvenile sex offender results in a harsh penalty.
Although the concurring and dissenting justices make valid arguments,
the majority came to the correct conclusion because, due to the
prevalence of child sexual abuse, society benefits more by requiring

336
juveniles offenders to register for life.

Juvenile offenders may never be rehabilitated enough to cease being
a threat to society. 33 7 CSOM, which noted that research does not
indicate that juvenile sex offenders will continue such abuse as adults,
seems to support the concurring and dissenting opinions' contention that
CSOM
the lifetime registration requirement is too harsh. 33 8
additionally notes that such offenders tend to be receptive to
treatment. 339 CSOM qualifies these remarks, however, by stating that
more conclusive research and data must be performed and analyzed
before CSOM can determine whether such statements on rehabilitation
rates are accurate. 340 Moreover, many scholars argue that, contrary to
335. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 755-56, 766-71 (Ill. 2003); see supra notes 299-300 and
accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice McMorrow's contention that a lifetime registration
requirement is too harsh a penalty for juveniles); supra note 314 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Kilbride's argument that a juvenile offender should not be subjected to a
lifetime registration requirement); see also supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles
in the court system and how the juvenile system is founded on the belief that children should be
treated differently).
336. See Long, supra note 268 (noting the large number of sexual predators on the Illinois sex
offender registry); see also KINNEAR, supra note 1,at 12 ("[M]ore recent research has shown that
sexual abuse of children can be found in all socioeconomic classes and family settings.").
337. See infra note 340 (noting that not all juvenile offenders can be successfully
rehabilitated).
338. TALBOT ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 ("Available research does not suggest that the majority
of sexually abusive youth are destined to become adult sex offenders.").
339. Id. ("Sexually abusive youth appear to respond well to cognitive-behavioral and/or
relapse prevention treatment, with rearrest rates of approximately 7 percent in follow-up periods
of more than five years."). Evidence indicates that there is a greater chance for rehabilitation of
juvenile sex offenders than there is for adult offenders. See Lee, supra note 4, at 524 ("Unlike
adults, the success rate of rehabilitating juvenile sex offenders is much higher."). Commentators
have noted that the legislature should focus on rehabilitation. See, e.g., Swearingen, supra note
82, at 575 ("Since today's juvenile offenders are tomorrow's adult offenders, the public's interest
in protecting its children from juvenile sex offenders would best be served by early intervention
and a continued focus on the traditional juvenile justice notions of confidentiality and
rehabilitation.").
340. TALBOT ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 ("[A]dditional data are needed to understand more
fully the extent and etiology of juvenile sex abuse as victimization data indicates that a vast
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CSOM's research, juvenile offenders are, in fact, likely to repeat the
abuse later in life, noting that children who begin sexually abusing
others as children will most likely continue such behavior in the
future.341 Therefore, although CSOM provides some support for the

concurring and dissenting opinions, the majority's view that registration
of juveniles is necessary to protect the public interest is stronger
because CSOM's research is inconclusive and many scholars contradict
342
its findings.
The opinions of the concurring and dissenting justices in J.W. also
find support within the academic community, as some scholars have
gone so far as to say that registration laws violate juvenile offenders'
constitutional rights. 343 Some scholars further argue that requiring
juveniles to register violates the protection mechanisms inherent in the

juvenile justice system. 344

Moreover, scholars argue that Megan's

number of sexual assaults go unreported and there may be even higher rates of under-reporting
among victims of incest/sibling offenses."). Further, it has been noted that not all juvenile
offenders can be successfully rehabilitated. See Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1824 ("[M]ost
juvenile sex offenders will eventually be released before they have been rehabilitated.").
341. See RENVOIZE, supra note 3, at 112-13 (noting that there is evidence showing a
correlation between the age an offender begins his offensive behavior and the chance that the
offender will continue that behavior and frequently offend in the future when such abuse occurred
in the child's home); Bremer, supra note 1, at 1346 ("The majority of imprisoned adult sexual
offenders reported that their sexual offense behaviors began in early adolescence."); Kikuchi,
supra note 320, at 109 ("Most adult sexual offenders admit that they began sexually offending as
children and adolescents."). Statistics support such an assertion. See RENVOIZE, supra note 3, at
113 ("Many recent studies have shown that a significant number of adult offenders have begun
deviant sexual patterns before they have reached 18, a significant number committing their first
offence between 12 and 15, and some even earlier." (citations omitted)).
342. See RENVOIZE, supra note 3, at 113 ("Since we know that in some cases a child can
begin his first abusive acts as early as 4 or 5, it is clear that future intensive abusers-to-be must be
trawled for not only amongst young teenagers but also amongst those just beginning school, even
in kindergarten.").
343. See Turoff, supra note 153, at 1127 ("[The application] of sexually violent predator laws
[to juveniles].., violates several constitutional principles at both the state and federal level....
[S]exually violent predator laws for juveniles violate both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
344. See David Heinzmann, Ruling To Affect Juvenile Sex Cases; State's Top Court Weighs
Registry, Youths' Privacy, CHI. TRIB., July 5, 2002, at IN ("[T]he possibility [of requiring
juvenile offenders to register] violates a basic principle of Juvenile Court, which is to protect
child offenders so they might be rehabilitated and get a fresh start to adult life."), available at
1994 WL 2672147; see also Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 177; Political Acts Often a Salve for
Grief,- ProtectingOthers Can Help Some Cope With Tragedy, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1996, at 16N
("Few politicians, even those worried it might go awry, have dared stand against Megan's Law.
Yet legislating by heart-rending example has its hazards, including the abridgment of rights in a
rush to avenge or heal."), available at 1996 WL 2740003; supra Part II.D (discussing the
treatment of juveniles in the court system). As Garfinkle has noted:
[B]y making sexual abuse the ultimate crime, lawmakers essentialize all parties down
to that single sexual experience. One party is assigned a lifetime identity as a
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Laws, such as the SORA, are not effective ways of preventing

recidivism of juvenile sex offenders. 345 Scholars also note that such
laws may give the public a false sense of security. 346 Further, they
contend that rehabilitation of the juvenile sex offender may be
impossible when the state requires the juvenile sex offenders to
347
register.

dangerous sexual predator, and the other is assigned a lifetime identity of a victim who
lost the one thing society valued the most, her innocence.
Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 177 (footnote omitted). Some also have reasoned that even if the
juvenile offender is rehabilitated successfully, he or she may have to live with the stigma of being
labeled a sex offender for the rest of his or her life. See Hiller, supra note 77, at 287-88 ("The
state's disclosure of juvenile sex offender registration information ...may inspire vigilantism,
public shame, social ostracism, and various types of adverse legal action, including loss of
employment and eviction. Certainly, subjecting a child to these harms is not nurturing or caring,
but stigmatizing... (footnote omitted)); see also Swearingen, supra note 82, at 555 (discussing
Megan's Law and noting that "not only does it not promote rehabilitation, but it in fact hinders
what little chance at rehabilitation juvenile sex offenders already have by isolating them,
degrading them, and reminding them every day of the unfortunate incident which led them down
their current path"). Further, it has been noted that most juvenile offenders faced social problems
before starting their abuse, and the registration requirement will likely enhance these problems.
Hiller, supra note 77, at 292.
[Jiuvenile sex offenders have difficulty maintaining close interpersonal relations and
are isolated from their peers. This alienation may encourage sexually aggressive
behavior.... Disclosure of [the] offender's past to his community may only serve to
increase his or her alienation, possibly encouraging re-offending, because of the
negative attitudes the public will emit toward the youth.
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
345. See Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 176.
[Slince the empirical evidence suggests that sex offending is more likely than other
kinds of offending to be an isolated event for an individual sex offender, rather than a
psychosis or deviant personality trait, then Megan's Laws are a far less effective and
palatable tool than the legislative debates would imply.
Id.
346. See Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen, Introduction to THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LAW,
POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT, at ix (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen eds., 1999).
While it is likely that [sex offender registration and community notification laws]
prevent some sexual offenses, they may revictimize some victims, cause increases in
vigilantism, and also provide a community with a false sense of security. They may
lead residents to believe that they know who the sex offenders in the community are,
ignoring the fact that these laws only identify convicted sexual offenders and that there
are likely to be many offenders among them who have never been caught ....
Id.; see also Bayles, supra note 64, at 3 ("'People often look for the easy, quick fix after a
tragedy,' said Patricia Toth, director of the National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse. 'But
no one thing is a panacea. It takes a combination of things, including law enforcement and
serious treatment of this problem while these offenders are in prison."'); Phillip J.O'Connor,
Nearly Half of State's Sex Offenders Not Registered, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 8, 1997, at 4
("Barely more than half of 14,000 convicted sex offenders in Illinois have registered with police
as required by law ....), available at 1997 WL 6340034.
347. See Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1823 ("Because these laws are founded on the belief that
many sex offenders are likely to re-offend after release, it is necessary to apply the rehabilitative
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Although these are valid points, the debate should focus instead on
the potential benefits achieved from the registration requirement
because this requirement may save the life of a child. 348 The statistics

on juvenile sex offenders show that this class of sex offenders poses a
substantial threat to the community. 349 The registration requirement
helps to curb this threat by aiding the law enforcement effort to keep
track of previous sex offenders and prevent future sexual attacks against

children. 350

In contrast, both the dissenting and concurring justices

advocate an approach that creates a lenient standard that would result in
the potential release of very dangerous offenders from the registration
requirement. 3 5 1 This moderate standard in turn would lead to an
increased possibility of sexual crimes that notification could have
prevented.35 2 On the other hand, scholars have noted that the majority's
registration requirement could have a desired rehabilitative effect on the

juveniles if implemented correctly, resulting in fully rehabilitated
juvenile offenders. 35 3 To properly implement registration requirements,

states must consider the treatment needs of the offenders, the statutes
must be designed by those members of the juvenile justice system who
will consider the rehabilitative needs of the offenders, and the
notification clauses of the statutes must both ensure public safety and
protect the juvenile's privacy and rehabilitation. 354 Therefore, the
ideal to the treatment of juvenile sex offenders, and to question the application of registration and
notification statutes to young sex offenders." (footnote omitted)); supra Part H.D (discussing the
treatment of juveniles in the court system).
348. The reaction from parents whose children were abused by J.W. show the importance of
notifying potential victims of juvenile sex offenders. See infra Part V.A (describing the reaction
of the parents of the victims to the J.W case praising the court for its holding).
349. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the number of sexual offenses
committed by juvenile sex offenders); infra note 381 and accompanying text (stating the number
of registered juvenile sex offenders in Illinois at the time of the J. W. case).
350. Logan, supra note 43, at 1289 ("Registration seeks to enhance the capacity of law
enforcement to monitor the whereabouts of released sex offenders and facilitate their re-arrest
should they commit a subsequent sex offense."); see supra Part ll.A and Part II.B (discussing the
history and purpose of Megan's Law and the SORA).
2003) ("The intent of the legislature in enacting
351. See In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 757 (I11.
the Registration Act was 'to create an additional method of protection for children from the
increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse."' (quoting People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d
637, 640 (Ill. 1991))); see also supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the high
likelihood of re-offense in adulthood for juvenile offenders).
352. Richardson, supra note 4, at 250.
353. Skoglund, supra note 10, at 1834-35 ("Through proper implementation, registration
statutes can strengthen the rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile justice system. Community
notification statutes may provide information to state agents without undermining the
rehabilitation of released offenders.").
354. Id. at 1835.
[Sluch statutes may serve the states' interests by protecting public safety and
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legislature should not rewrite the SORA to render it inapplicable to

from
juveniles because the registration requirement prevents minors
355
becoming victims and assists juveniles in their rehabilitation.
Further, the propriety of requiring juveniles to register per the SORA
becomes clear after an examination of the original purpose of the state
and federal registration and notification laws. 3 56 The legislatures
initially designed these laws with the protection of the potential child

victim in mind, not protection of the offender. 357 Opponents may argue
that in helping the victim, the legislature must also consider the rights of
the offender. 358 While this is true, the needs of the victim outweigh the
rights of the offender; moreover, the public will better accept a statute

that protects a victim than one359that furthers the offender's rights at the
expense of the victim's rights.
As noted above, others have argued that holding juveniles to such
requirements eliminates the prospect of rehabilitation 360 and defies the
To do so effectively, states must implement
rehabilitating young offenders.
nonproportional indeterminate dispositions that provide individualized treatment
models with durations relevant to the juvenile offender's treatment needs. Second,
registration and notification statutes should be implemented by agents of the juvenile
justice system who will consider the effects of community notification on the
offender's rehabilitative needs. When applied, notification should be limited to the
extent necessary to nurture juveniles' rehabilitation and to protect public safety. It will
be a challenge for legislatures and courts to look past punitive sound bites and propose
progressive solutions. The ultimate result of this experiment will transcend the false
dichotomy and benefit our children and our communities.
Id. See generally supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
355. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text (stating the proposition that registration
helps prevent future victims and aids in rehabilitative efforts).
356. See supra Part H.A-B (tracing the development of federal and Illinois registration and
notification laws).
357. See Lee, supra note 4, at 490 ("Megan's Law was primarily created to address this
problem [of repeat sex offenders], rather than to punish previously convicted sex offenders.");
supra Part II.A (discussing the history and purpose of Megan's Law and the SORA).
358. Swearingen, supra note 82, at 561 ("Megan's Law does not even consider the protection
of the offender a relevant concern."). Scholars have proposed that the legislatures create a more
evenly tailored statute to protect the juvenile offender's interest. See Bremer, supra note 1, at
1364 (concluding that, with the one-sided nature of these statutes, "[p]erhaps it is time to consider
a more moderate road, with legal changes closing the gap between leniency and stringency").
359. See Nicole Marie Nigrelli, Comment, The Sex Offender Registry: Is It Attacking People
That Were Not Meant To Be a Part of the law?, 4 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 343, 363
(1999) ("The sex offender registry was implemented to protect the public, not to protect an
offender.... The argument that the law is overinclusive overlooks the entire purpose and intent
of the Act.").
360. See supra note 347 (discussing the importance of the rehabilitation factor in determining
whether to extend the registration requirement to juvenile offenders); see also Hiller, supra note
77, at 271-72 ("[T]he required disclosure of a juvenile sex offender's identity to the public
contradicts both the state's interest in protecting minors under the philosophy of parens patriae
and the basic premise underlying the creation of juvenile courts-rehabilitation-because
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However,

allowing the offender to attempt rehabilitation before subjecting him or
her to the registration requirement leaves open the possibility that the
36 2
offender will again attack innocent and unsuspecting victims.
Contrary to Chief Justice McMorrow's opinion, the legislature should

not rewrite the SORA to make it comparable to the Megan's Laws of
other states. 36 3 Indeed, adopting a state statute that bases registration
requirements on the number of offenses committed, such as the one

followed in Mississippi, 364 could result in increased opportunities for
the offender to victimize unsuspecting children because the Mississippi
statute does not notify the community of the juvenile sex offender until
he has committed two separate acts of abuse. 365 Furthermore, adopting
a statute like those of Indiana, 366 New Jersey, 367 or Washington 368 may

disclosure inhibits such rehabilitation." (footnotes omitted)); Swearingen, supra note 82, at 555
(discussing Megan's Law and noting, "If the Juvenile Code is premised primarily on the ideas of
rehabilitation and treatment of juvenile offenders, the application of Megan's Law to these
offenders is not sound policy. Megan's Law is not rehabilitative in any sense of the word.").
361. See Hiller, supra note 77, at 282-83.
Public disclosure of a juvenile sex offender's registration information will ... create
the potential for public violence and anger against the juvenile. This state-influenced
harm is contrary to the state's protective role under parens patriae, which aims to
protect the child in the juvenile system, and the rehabilitative goals on which the
juvenile court system was built.
Id. (footnotes omitted). However, it has also been noted that adapting the registration
requirement so that such information will be kept confidential will allow the state to fulfill its
parens patriae duty. See id. at 288. See generally supra Part Il.D (discussing the treatment of
juveniles in the court system).
362. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood of re-offense in
adulthood).
363. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice McMorrow's
discussion of other states' registration laws and her suggestion that the legislature amend the

SORA).
364. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi's registration
requirement for juvenile offenders). Scholars also have noted the problems with other state
statutes, such as Minnesota. See Logan, supra note 43, at 1331 (discussing the Minnesota courts'
reaction to juvenile sex offender registration statutes).
365. Richardson, supra note 4, at 261 (criticizing Mississippi's system by noting that "waiting
for a second sex offense conviction before requiring registration creates the possibility that a
juvenile sex offender will be able to abuse several [more] victims before anyone in the
surrounding community is notified of his identity"); see, e.g., Kikuchi, supra note 320, at 109-10
("Young offenders need to be identified and treated early: By adolescence, many offending
children have abused more than one child and the deviant sexual behaviors are often well
established."); see also supra note 341 and accompanying text (stating that juvenile sex offenders
are likely to continue their abuse of children into adulthood).
366. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana's registration requirement
for juvenile offenders).
367. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey's registration
requirement for juvenile offenders).
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also result in more needless attacks on children in uninformed
communities because these statutes allow juveniles to cease registration
if they show they are no longer a threat to society, they are not likely to
reoffend, or that their registration will not further the legislative intent
of the registration requirement. 369 Thus, if the adopted standards are
not strict enough, otherwise easily preventable sexual offenses against
children may nonetheless occur. 370 Therefore, although on its face the
statute and its potential results may seem harsh, the legislature should
not rewrite the statute to explicitly bar juvenile sex offenders from the

registration requirement or reduce this requirement for such 37
offenders
1
because of the potentially deadly and disastrous consequences.
V. IMPACT

Victims and their families have already applauded the J. W decision,
and the decision will likely have an impact on future sexual crimes
against children. 372 The case will prevent future attacks on children
by
3 73
keeping the public aware of potential dangers in the community.
A. Applause from Victims
The J. W. decision has already impacted the victims in the case. 374 In
reaction to the decision, the parents of the victims involved in the case
368. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing Washington's registration
requirement for juvenile offenders).
369. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the potential problems in not
requiring juvenile offenders to register). Even if the offender has not re-offended in the period he
was required to register, if he is not rehabilitated, he will likely strike again. Hiller, supra note
77, at 292 ("[Gliven the fact that 60-80% of adult sex offenders start sex offending as juveniles,
experts deduce that without effective rehabilitation, the majority of juvenile sex offenders will
inevitably continue their sex offending into adulthood.").
370. Richardson, supra note 4, at 250.
371. See id. at 237-39 (discussing the murder of a child by her neighbor, a juvenile sex
offender, prior to registration and notification laws); Victor I. Vieth, When the Child Abuser Is a
Child: Investigating, Prospectingand Treating Juvenile Sex Offenders in the New Millennium, 25

HAMLINE L. REv. 47, 51-52 (2001) (discussing the serious nature and statistics of juvenile sex
offenders and their crimes).
372. See infra Part V.A (discussing the impact of the J.W. case on victims and their families).
373. See infra Part V.B (discussing the impact of the J.W. decision on potential future
attacks).
374. See generally Long, supra note 268 (discussing the ramifications of the J.W. decision).
In addition to the impact on the victims, the J.W. decision has impacted the Illinois courts, as
Illinois courts already have been faced with similar cases and followed the standard set forth by
the majority in J. W. regarding the registration requirement for juvenile sex offenders. See, e.g., In
re Todd 0., 789 N.E.2d 301, 301 (IIl. 2003) (vacating an appellate court's decision and directing
the appellate court on remand to reconsider its judgment in light of the J.W decision ); In re
Donald R., 796 N.E.2d 670, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 2003) (looking to the J.W. decision to
support the finding that requiring a minor to register as a sex offender was not an excessive
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championed the lifetime registration requirement because of its ability
to protect potential victims. 3 75 Further, parents in the South Elgin area

have argued that such a requirement is necessary for juvenile offenders
because such offenders do not cease to pose a threat merely because
they have turned eighteen years of age. 3 76 Parents of victims have
given their approval to the J. W. decision, which takes the victims' rights
377
into consideration along with the juvenile offenders' rights.

B. Prevention of Future Crime

Courts always will have a difficult time deciding the proper course of
action regarding a juvenile sex offender, as there are strong opinions on
both sides. 378 Opponents of extending a lifetime or lesser duration
registration requirement to juvenile offenders worry about the impact of
treating juveniles in the same manner as adults and argue that such
37 9
equal treatment defies the concept of a juvenile justice system.
condition of probation); In re D.R., 794 N.E.2d 888, 891 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (following
J.W. in requiring a sixteen-year-old adjudicated for criminal sexual abuse to register as a sex
offender under the SORA); In re J.R., 793 N.E.2d 687, 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (holding
that a juvenile sex offender did not demonstrate that applying the SORA and the Notification Law
to juvenile sex offenders violated procedural or substantive due process).
375. Long, supra note 268. The mother of one of J.W.'s victims noted, "'At least I know
we'll have that safeguard."' Id. A parent of a different victim in a separate case involving a
thirteen-year-old sex offender noted that "she never would have believed that a child could be a
predator until her children became prey." Id. When considering the impact of registration or
notification requirements on potential victims and what such requirements can potentially
prevent, the devastating effects of child sexual abuse must be considered. See RENVOIZE, supra
note 3, at 144. The author notes:
Some victims of child sexual abuse will recover completely, some will seem to have
put their experiences completely behind them, only to find themselves overwhelmed by
painful memories later; for many others their lives will be dogged by a variety of ills,
such as anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, self-destructive behaviour, a tendency to
substance abuse and revictimization, and difficulties in allowing themselves to trust
anyone. At the far end of this continuum of damage lies total psychiatric breakdown,
or suicide.
Id.; see also Kikuchi, supra note 320, at 109 ("Sexual abuse offenses committed by children and
adolescents have lasting consequences for both the victims and the offenders.").
376. Long, supra note 268 ("People need to know that the offender is a danger to society past
the age of 18 ....
(internal quotations omitted)).
377. Id. ("'Everybody is concerned about the constitutional rights of the juvenile offender....
Nobody is concerned about the constitutional rights of the juvenile victim. This is a major step in
the right direction."' (quoting a parent of a victim)).
378. See Richardson, supra note 4, at 255 (discussing the divergence in state registration
statutes' treatment of juvenile sex offenders); see also RENVOIzE, supra note 3, at xii-xiii ("The
real problem is that the crime of child sexual abuse is so loathed that few people even want to
think about it, let alone consider ways of treating the offenders.").
379. Richardson, supra note 4, at 240-41 ("Opponents argue that treating juveniles and adults
equally contradicts the rationale that led to the creation of a separate and distinct justice system
for juveniles."). Scholars also have noted that Megan's Laws, which apply to both adults and
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However, the statistics on the number of serious crimes committed by
juveniles, specifically sex offenses, demonstrates that the juvenile
justice system has not performed as some may have hoped. 380 Indeed,
at the time of the J. W. case, the Illinois State Police records indicated
that 455 of the 14,930 registered sex offenders in Illinois were
381
juveniles.
The lifetime registration requirement helps ensure that communities
3 82
are aware of potentially dangerous individuals in their midst.

Protection of the community at large necessitates application of this
requirement to sexual predators of any age. 383 Allowing some sexual
predators to cease registration solely because of their youth will not
keep the community safe. 3 84 By making the public more aware of
juveniles, contradict the historical trend of separating the criminal justice systems for adults and
juveniles. E.g., Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 182 ("The commingling of juvenile and adult
offenders within most Megan's Laws represents a marked departure from the century-old practice
of separate juvenile and adult criminal justice systems."); see also supra Part 11.D (discussing the
treatment of juveniles in the court system). Furthermore, they contend that the legislatures did
not intend for such types of laws to apply to juveniles. See Garfinkle, supra note 9, at 183
("[T]here was no mention in legislative debates of the child sex offenders who would be subject
to community notification under federal Megan's Law."); supra Part lI.C.3 (discussing Justice
Kilbride's dissenting opinion that such laws should not apply to juvenile offenders.); supra Part
IV.B (discussing the lifetime registration requirement's effect on juvenile offenders).
380. Richardson, supra note 4, at 241-42. Juveniles account for an estimated one-fifth of all
rapes and one-half of all child molestation cases committed each year. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text (discussing CSOM's report on juvenile sex offenders); see also supra Part
11.D (discussing the treatment of juveniles in the court system).
381. Heinzmann, supra note 344.
382. See Nigrelli, supra note 359, at 363 ("The public has the right to know when someone in
their community poses a risk to loved ones when they inquire about that particular offender.").
The public has shown that it wants to be aware of such offenders in the community. See Becky
Beaupre & Robert C. Herguth, Registry Site PopularBut Draws Fire, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 16,
2000, at 9 ("When the State Police posted the names of all registered sex offenders in Illinois on
the Internet in November, the reaction was immediate. Visitors jammed the site, which offers
addresses, birthdates and other information about more than 14,000 registered offenders."),
availableat 2000 WL 6664817. See generally supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing
the J.W. court's assessment of the limited dissemination of information provided by the
Notification Law).
383. See Richardson, supra note 4, at 239-40 ("Tragic stories similar to that of Kristi Blevins
have resulted in an increased legislative awareness of the dangers posed to the community by
juvenile sex offenders."). Even scholars who have expressed concern with sex offender laws
have conceded that such laws ultimately will be accepted in order to save the public. See Schlank
& Cohen, supra note 346, at x ("Sex offender statutes do appear to be withstanding legal scrutiny
and are likely to be around for quite some time, despite the best efforts of those intent on
continuing the heated debate concerning their appropriateness."); supra note 279 and
accompanying text (discussing the J.W. court's opinion that the statute is serving the best interest
of the public).
384. See Hiller, supra note 77, at 280 ("[Tloday's juvenile sex offender exhibits more
physical aggression and violence in his or her sexually abusive behavior than in the past.");
Richardson, supra note 4, at 240 ("[Tragic stories of the murder of children by juvenile sex
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potential offenders, the lifetime registration requirement will help
ensure that the community is mindful of the dangers that could befall

their children and will work to prevent such danger.385 Parents will be
more likely to keep a closer eye on their children to prevent the fate of
children such as Megan Kanka. 386 Further, if such a requirement did
not exist, a sexual predator who began his offenses at a young age and

who was never rehabilitated may never be identified. 387 Therefore, the
legislature and courts are correct to err on the side of caution and protect
the victims' interests first.3 88
VII. CONCLUSION

Developed to protect children from the harms of potential sex
offenders, the Wetterling Act, Megan's Law, and the SORA were born
out of senseless tragedies. Although some may argue that reporting

requirements stigmatize sex offenders, it is important to remember that
registration requirements apply only to perpetrators of some of the most
vile and loathsome crimes. No one is required to register unless

convicted or adjudicated of a sexual offense against a child.
The Illinois Supreme Court confronted this issue in In re J.W. The
court interpreted the SORA and held that the lifetime reporting

requirement applies to juvenile sex offenders. Applying the SORA to
require these juveniles to register for the rest of their natural lives
offenders] have... sparked the current trend among states to broaden the scope of adult
community notification and registration statutes.., to include juveniles." (footnote omitted));
supra note 280 and accompanying text (noting the J.W. majority opinion that registration should
not be prohibited because of the age of the offender).
385. See supra note 61 (stating that Megan Kanka's parents believed Megan would not have
been murdered if they had known a pedophile lived in their neighborhood). For example, parents
who know a sexual predator lives in their neighborhood may take extra precautions to ensure that
no harm comes to their child, such as walking them to and from school and keeping track of
where they are at all times and with whom they are playing.
386. See supranote 61 (discussing the murder of Megan Kanka).
387. See supra note 341 (discussing the likelihood of re-offense when the juvenile offender is
not rehabilitated).
388. See Lee, supra note 4, at 514 (noting that opponents of Megan's Laws incorrectly fail to
consider the victims Megan's Laws aim to protect); see also supra note 357 (stating that the
application of the SORA in J.W. goes to support the initial legislative intent of protecting child
victims of such abuse). As Lee noted:
Because Megan's Law does not completely guarantee protection against sex offenders,
some commentators argue that its provisions promote a false sense of security.
Commentators also argue that because most victims know their attackers, Megan's
Law will provide little added protection. Both arguments provide practical assertions
which fail to consider those victims, although small in number, the law attempts to
protect.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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admittedly can be considered harsh. However, this does not mean that
the legislature should amend the statute to excuse juveniles from such a
standard, as the harsh standard serves the best interests of the
community.
The legislature enacted the SORA to protect the
community and its children, and to achieve this goal, the public must be
aware of all sex offenders and potential threats in their respective
communities regardless of the age of the offender. Even if juvenile
offenders can show clear and convincing evidence that they do not pose
a risk of reoffense, the public has the right to know that at one point the
juvenile did pose such a threat. Such a course of action is the only way
to protect the best interests of the people of Illinois.

